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November 17, 1941

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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Has the Tide Turned?

Within the past few days a thrill of hope has run through the democratic section of the world. It has been caused by a number of things, none of overwhelming importance by itself but significant when added together. There was Stalin's speech, breathing confidence that a Hitler defeat may be only one year away. There was Churchill's announcement (accompanied by the British victory in the Mediterranean) that Britain's darkest hour is now behind her—an announcement rendered doubly significant because the British Prime Minister has never hesitated to take a pessimistic view when he felt that pessimism was justified. There was the speech by Hitler and the magazine article by Goebbels, both of which conspicuously lacked the Nazis' usual cocky tone. There was an increasing impression that Japan is badly frightened at the prospect of war with the United States, and the sudden reports from Tokyo that there is a secret oral escape clause in the Axis agreement, so that the Japanese do not necessarily have to go to war even if Germany is attacked. There is the continued magnificent resistance of the Russians before Moscow, a city that most Americans had given up for lost several weeks back. There is the mounting figure of American war production which, while still far less than it ought to be and could be, is nevertheless in certain types of equipment beginning to assume impressive proportions.

Not Out of the Woods

Certainly there is nothing in the present picture to justify overconfidence or the slightest relaxation of effort. An intensified effort is needed. In all types of war material combined, Hitler is still exceeding the joint product of Britain and the United States by a substantial margin. There is still a strong chance that Russia will be forced to make a last stand behind the Volga, or even that her main war effort may be rendered impossible. Some experts believe the danger that Britain will be invaded is by no means over and that Hitler may turn back to such an effort within the next few weeks. The vacillation and timidity of the British and American governments in relation to Japan still compel Russia to keep large military forces in Siberia.

For the people of the democracies, Hitlerism might be likened to an aching tooth that ought to be pulled. They would like to get rid of the ache but they shrink from the pain of the extraction. What they ought to realize is that the short sharp pain of an all-out effort is better than a continuance of the ache indefinitely, accompanied by the grim assurance that it will get much worse. For Hitler, in this analogy, is an ulcerated tooth.

No Call for a Strike

If the leaders of the Railroad Brotherhoods are in their right minds they will accept, with a minimum of bluster, the recommendations of the President's Emer-

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gency Board. The board has awarded the operating men a 7.5-percent pay increase and the non-operating men one of 9 cents an hour—or 13.5 percent. The additional payroll will amount to about $240,000,000, of which about $60,000,000 will apply to the present year. The original demands called for a 30-percent pay increase for the operating men and about 40 percent for the non-operating men. These demands would have increased the railroad payroll from roughly two billion to almost three billion dollars a year, and can be interpreted only as an "asking figure" which the men themselves must have realized would be subject to drastic reductions. The board also recommended a week's vacation, with pay, for the non-operating men (the operating men did not ask for vacations), but annoyed the Brotherhoods by suggesting that the entire question of railroad wages be reopened at the close of 1942.

The Brotherhoods have thirty days (from November 5) in which to accept the board's findings or to decide on going through with the strike. A railroad strike, in the present war crisis, would be nothing short of madness. It is to be hoped that the Brotherhoods will not keep on talking strike until the last minute, only to abandon an untenable position after public opinion has been thoroughly alienated and the prospect of anti-strike legislation notably improved.

The ILO Conference

For the first time since 1919, the year of its founding, the International Labor Office has held a conference in this country. The 1941 conference, which closed with a meeting in the White House, had much in common with the sessions of twenty-two years ago. Then, as now, world reconstruction dominated the discussions. Then, as now, a phrase from the ILO's constitution—"Universal peace can be established only if based upon social justice"—summed up the creed of all thinking human beings.

The past twenty-two years have tragically demonstrated the futility of faith without works. In that period the ILO, representing government, labor and management on a worldwide scale, did many useful things, but the promise of 1919 was emphatically not fulfilled. This year's sessions in New York and Washington, attended by 100 official delegates from 35 nations, some of them now under the fascist yoke, seemed to reflect a new seriousness of purpose. The delegates appeared to understand that drastic changes must be made in the world's economic life if civilization is to survive.

The conference, of course, dealt in large part with generalities, but, in setting up a small tripartite committee "to study and prepare measures of reconstruction," it recognized the need for prompt concrete action. The fact that about a dozen Cabinet ministers were present and that the conference had strong backing from the Roosevelt administration indicated that the ILO would be able to make its reconstruction proposals heard in the right places—provided, of course, that fascism is defeated.

Perhaps the conference's greatest failure was the ignorance it showed of American publicity methods. Too many years at Geneva have seemingly numbed the ILO's sense of the importance of addressing the common man. Now that Montreal has become its working headquarters, the ILO may learn the technique of presenting its case simply and well. The world's need, it is hoped, will impel the ILO not simply to state its case but to fight without quarter for the ideal of social justice it was founded to realize.

Finland Holds Her Tongue

The demand by the United States Government that Finland withdraw from the war against Soviet Russia has received no official reply from Helsinki as we go to press. A rumor that the Helsinki radio reported Finnish military operations to be "drawing to a close" appears to be groundless. This radio station has, however, suggested that Finland's reply to the United States is about ready to go out and that it will not be a favorable one. A major point in the reply will be that the Soviet Union had made no overtures in the direction of a peace offer.

It was presumably to squelch this argument in advance that Secretary Hull produced official State Department records to prove that as early as August 18 the Soviet Union had made certain peace proposals to the Finnish government. These proposals were to be based on territorial compensation to Finland for her losses in the Russo-Finnish war.

It must be presumed that the Finnish government has been anxious to delay an official reply to the United States for as long as possible, on the grounds that the more territory their soldiers can gain, the more advantageous their bargaining power. But Finland would be miscalculating if she imagined that Allied appeasement would apply to her as it has to Vichy France and Spain. In her case the Soviet Union is the country mainly involved and Moscow is not likely to put up with Allied dallying at a time when Russian resistance is at its most critical stage.

The Case of Largo Caballero

Francisco Largo Caballero, Spanish Premier during the Civil War, has been arrested in France on a demand by Spain that he be extradited. We hope the Vichy government will muster up courage enough to refuse this request, as it has done in the cases of some other political refugees. Otherwise Largo Caballero is likely to be executed the moment Franco can lay hands on him, as was done with Companys and has been done with hundreds and thousands of other Spaniards whose crime—and it is a real crime in Europe today—was that

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they loved liberty. We trust that before Vichy sends Largo Caballero to his death the French will ponder the effect such an act will have on American public opinion.

Campaign Aftermath

It is grand good news that Mayor LaGuardia was reëlected in New York City. If he had been defeated it would have been interpreted around the world as a triumph for the fascists of whom he has been such a bitter and outspoken foe.

There are, however, some things about the campaign that still leave a bad taste in the mouth. It is disturbing that more than a million New Yorkers out of the less than two and a quarter million who voted should call themselves Democrats and yet be completely indifferent to the wishes and attitude of the head of the party, President Roosevelt. A good many of these individuals apparently still believe in machine politics of the Tammany type and are willing to ignore its cost in inefficiency, lack of imagination and downright corruption. Some of them, it is obvious, are open sympathizers with fascism, members of the Christian Front or holding the same point of view. The Democratic campaign was conducted at a low level; the two chief points of strategy were the charge that LaGuardia had spent on his candidacy five times as much as turned out to be the case, and the broadcast lie that President Roosevelt had withdrawn his endorsement of the Little Flower.

Among the people who did themselves irreparable damage in the course of the campaign are Governor Lehman of New York and James A. Farley. The Governor can never in his whole lifetime explain his defection from the cause of high standards in government to support for pure opportunism a party whose main appeal was on such a low level. And Mr. Farley, when he accused Mayor LaGuardia of being a communist, sank to a gutter level of falsehood that represented the lowest point in his whole career.

Professor Roosevelt

It is interesting to note how many of the President's finest speeches have been made before labor groups. Addressing the delegates of the International Labor Organization in the White House last week, Mr. Roosevelt, apparently extemporaneously, spoke with the quietness and confidence with which one discusses present problems and future plans with one's understanding friends. To the delegates from abroad, he explained that the United States had made an "unlimited commitment that there should be a free world," pointedly including the Chinese people among those whom he complimented for their sacrifices for freedom from aggression. He pointed out that that free world, after the war, must include economic security for the masses of the people.

To labor in the United States, and to all Americans who, stirred up by a badly one-sided press, have been clamoring for labor's head in a basket, he said exactly what needed to be said: that industrial grievances must be settled by the machinery of collective bargaining which this country has established. He accused a few labor leaders, and a few industrialists, of putting their personal advantage above the welfare of the nation and denounced especially those who are concerned only with "their little victories over one another." The President has kept his head well in the storm of emotion that has swept the country over labor problems in recent weeks. The solution of those troubles is not to be found in hastily "passing a law." It lies in an educational campaign which has two main objectives: to convince recalcitrant employers that the Wagner Act is here to stay and that workers have the right to organize and bargain collectively, and to convince labor that jurisdictional and personal feuds must be dropped. The President's speech was an admirable, level-headed contribution to that campaign.

Lowering the Draft Age

A report has it that Congress may be asked to lower the minimum draft age from twenty-one to eighteen. The reason seems to lie in the state of national health and literacy. According to Brigadier General Hershey, the selective-service director, more than 50 percent of the men examined for the army thus far have been rejected. Minor physical disabilities accounted for most rejections, but 150,000 men were turned down because they had not reached the fourth-grade educational level that draft regulations require.

The picture General Hershey paints is not flattering. This nation has fallen short of the goals of public health and education that a democracy ought to achieve. At the same time it seems to be true that high physical standards have been set for the draftees and that men who would be acceptable to the armies of other nations have been turned down by ours.

The proposal to overcome the looming shortage of military manpower by lowering the draft age will not be popular. Congress recognized that when it set the age limit at twenty-one, and no one will welcome the prospect of putting mere boys under arms. The grim fact, though, is that these youngsters make the best soldiers. They have the stamina and resilience that modern war demands. In terms of military efficiency the minimum age should have been eighteen from the start.

A Matter of Libel

Libel is a subject that most newspapers would just as soon forget, which may account for the fact that the public has heard little about a rather curious suit now pending in Philadelphia. What makes the case curious is that it involves newspapers and newspapermen exclusively.

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The case had its origin in a story written last April 17 by John O'Donnell, chief of the Washington bureau of the isolationist New York Daily News. Mr. O'Donnell said that American warships were secretly convoying supply ships across the Atlantic. The next day the interventionist Philadelphia Record ran an editorial called "A Deliberate Lie," referring to the O'Donnell story. On the basis of the editorial Mr. O'Donnell entered suit for $50,000 damages. Stephen J. Early and two Washington correspondents have since come to The Record's defense.

The Daily News, of course, is closely linked to the equally isolationist Chicago Tribune, and a Tribune attorney, Louis G. Caldwell, is acting as one of Mr. O'Donnell's lawyers. Some newspapermen are struck by the fact that The Tribune has been regularly attacking The Record, accusing the Philadelphia paper, in one instance, of receiving a New Deal subsidy. Recently The Tribune went so far as to refuse to renew its syndicate contract with The Record, leaving the comic-strip hero, Moon Mullins, homeless in Philadelphia, and giving Dick Tracy to The Record's chief rival. The arm of "The World's Greatest Newspaper" reaches far.

November

The country was angry and divided. The leader of one great political party in an election accused the leader of the other of seeking a personal dictatorship. His denunciations were echoed by millions of his countrymen, who spread flowers upon the carpet over which he walked to make one of his final addresses before the campaign closed. A group of writers took a page in a newspaper to warn the country that if the man accused of seeking a dictatorship were elected, the government would be paralyzed by bitter enmity between the Executive and Congress. It was repeated, and hotly answered in newspapers all over the country. That was November a year ago. The defeated candidate in that election is now one of the sources of strength of the man whose ambitions he then feared. The policy which both believe is essential for the preservation of the country has been supported by Congress by unbroken majorities, and after the fullest and most searching analysis. It is a large country, with elbowroom for diversity of opinions and for misunderstanding. Its democratic processes have knit it together into the greatest power in the world.

Last Week

Speaking in New York City, Arthur Krock, the columnist of The New York Times, said that the administration should be more candid in its presentation of its policies, foreign and domestic. Mr. Krock's premise was that the American people are grown up, and can bear the full truth. In Mr. Krock's own bailiwick, Washington, many of the people's representatives tried hard to submit evidence that would undermine his faith in their maturity. Senator O'Daniel of Texas, looking upon the amendment of the Neutrality Act as a game, wanted the Senate to make believe that a piece of anti-labor legislation should be part of it. . . . Senator Byrd voted against the amendment, which he had for a long time encouraged. He wants anti-labor legislation too. If I can't have peppermint ice cream with chocolate sauce I won't eat *any* supper. . . . Representative Fish introduced a resolution in the House calling for a formal declaration of war, to which he is strongly opposed. Representative Short of Missouri, a Republican, excoriated Wendell Willkie for speaking as a Republican "when he had never been elected to any office and couldn't be elected dog-catcher anywhere." Representative McCormack, Democratic floor leader, rose in astonishment to ask why the Republicans had nominated Mr. Willkie for President. "Because you Democrats palmed him off on us in the hopes of ruining us," said Mr. Short. Whatever happens is teacher's fault.

But Mr. Krock is right. The antidote for the talk and tactics of Messrs. Short, Fish, Byrd and O'Daniel is not more of the same but more of the opposite.

The Home Fires, Too

IT IS NOW CLEAR that the United States will either enter the war actively or will remain on practically a war footing until Hitler is overthrown. The editors of The New Republic hope that it will be the former, but as far as domestic affairs are concerned, the effect will be about the same in either case. American progressives should recognize now that they are in for a difficult time and that they will need to use all possible diligence both to prevent the loss of recent gains for liberalism at home and to make sure that the outcome of the war will not be another tragic folly like that of 1919 which made the present struggle inevitable.

For the truth is that the battle between progress and reaction is a never ending one and that war conditions in many ways favor reaction. We are seeing the truth of this at the present moment in several ways.

People who have always hated unions are trying to use the national-defense emergency to destroy some of labor's recent gains, just as certain short-sighted labor leaders are trying to take advantage of the national peril and hold up the country. Civil liberties are imperiled, and here too, what is coming is undoubtedly worse than what we are already witnessing. In Congress there is a rash of new bills and of old ones revived, the general purpose of which is to make it a crime to be an alien or a radical, even if that radicalism be of the purely theoretical, closet type. The mounting tension has helped to bring on such dismal

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spectacles as a Communist in New York City being given one and a half to two years in the penitentiary for perjury on the witness stand which, in a non-Communist, would certainly have been punished by $10 or ten days; as the state of Oklahoma sentencing people to ten years in prison for possessing the same "seditious literature" that is to be found in every good college library; as a tiny handful of Trotskyists in Minneapolis solemnly being tried as though they constituted a genuine revolutionary threat to the government of the United States.

If in wartimes we tend to slip back into the mud, we also in such times suddenly see the areas where we have never properly advanced. One of these is the treatment of the Negro. Roi Ottley in The New Republic for November 10 showed how we still practise wholesale racial discrimination as we set out to do battle with Hitler, one of whose chief crimes is that he practises wholesale racial discrimination. The tide of Negro resentment is growing. It is not being augmented by the leaders of the Negro race; on the contrary, they are doing their best to hold it back.

If you want to see how little, in truth, the war effort belongs to the progressive forces, take a look at Congress, which still refuses to pass a fair tax bill based on capacity to pay and removing an adequate share of war profits (for details, see E. D. Kennedy's current series in this paper); at Congress, which is still toying with inflation in ways which Michael Straight describes in this issue.

When we turn from domestic matters to international ones, there are certainly enough problems to give American progressives concern. Twenty-five years ago we went to war uttering catchwords quite as noble as those heard at the present day; some of them, indeed, were practically identical. Yet long before America entered the First World War, any hope of a decent settlement had been destroyed by a whole series of secret treaties in which the chief Allies except the United States participated (it is a matter of dispute whether the British tried to tell President Wilson about them and he brushed the information aside).

Today we are in a less advantageous position to bargain; Hitler in 1941 is much more of a threat to us than the Kaiser was in 1917, and in a more real sense than before, England and her Allies are fighting our battle for us. Nevertheless, American progressives cannot and must not forget that the kind of war this is and the kind of peace that will come after it are of the utmost importance to the United States.

They are disturbed when they see the fate of India apparently depend on the whim of Winston Churchill, who with all his very great merits in other ways certainly possess a sahib mentality. They are disturbed to see the British send to America a man with antecedents like those of Lord Halifax and then expect him to fit comfortably into the pattern of a Washington that has been dominated for eight and one-half years by the New Deal—which Lord Halifax would certainly have fought tooth and nail if he had been an American. They are disturbed that Hitler, whose sources of information are good, should continue to feel that perhaps he can win the British government back to appeasement or even to coöperation in an anti-Russian campaign. They are disturbed to see in important posts in the British government men who lend color to this idea of Hitler's, men like Viscount Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare, Colonel Moore-Brabazon, Oliver Lyttleton, Captain Margesson, Lord Woolton, Sir Kingsley Wood and many others.

It was reactionaries, in many countries, who brought on the First World War and by their stupidity and short-sightedness made the second one inevitable. Unless the progressives can get control, unless there is a real change in our way of thinking both nationally and internationally, such reactionaries will end this war (assuming Hitler doesn't) with a Carthaginian peace, a resumption of cutthroat capitalist competition, that will make the Third World War inevitable in another twenty years or less. The task before American progressives, both at home and abroad, is one of the greatest urgency. The editors of The New Republic pledge themselves to coöperate in that effort to the utmost limits of their power.

Address to the German Nation

ON NOVEMBER 8 HITLER made another of his speeches, this time in Munich on the occasion of the eighteenth anniversary of the Beerhall Putsch. It was not an important speech, since it repeated much that he had said before—the boasts about the Russian war, the threats to America, the ridicule of the British. But it set us to thinking of what a candid leader might have told his people about the achievements of the Nazi revolution, and the position of Germany in the world today, her prospects for the future. We have borrowed for this speech the title of Fichte's famous lectures, delivered a century and a quarter ago when another dictator, Napoleon, still occupied German territory. There is no leader in Germany today who would dare make the speech. But if he dared, this is how he might sum up where Germany stands in November, 1941.

"People of Germany, do not be misled by the victories that Hitler's armies have been winning, nor by the show of strength all about you. These men who call themselves your leaders are not gods, although they assault the very heavens. While they have won battles, they stand a very good chance of losing the war. And, as someone has remarked, a dictatorship always looks strongest five minutes before its collapse.

"What have the Germans gained from the Nazi movement and the Nazi state in the eighteen years

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since the Beerhall Putsch? Our economic achievement seems considerable. We have put our idle back to work, stepped up production, made use of the furthest reaches of technology. But what is strong about our economy is due to the techniques of planning, and what is weak is due to Nazi ideas and Nazi leadership. We could have achieved much more if we had had planning under a democratic state, without coercion and without terror. We live under a hybrid that is neither capitalism nor socialism, but retains the worst features of both. The business men who thought this was a sure road to the power of their class find themselves tangled in a maze of regulations; the small business men have almost vanished, and the big ones are never safe from the terrorism of the ruling state clique. The radicals who thought this was the sure road to socialism find that capitalism still exists in the worst aspects of the profit system, that the power of monopolies has been sharpened, that wealth and income are more unequally distributed than ever, that living standards for workers are lower than ever, that millions of them have been killed or reduced to slave labor.

"And how about the German military achievement? Germany has always had a great military tradition. And the Nazis have made the military machine the crux of everything else. They have done well to wipe out the old officer caste, and to tap new layers of military ability in the lower social ranks. They have applied the machine process to the arts of war to the *n*th degree. But what have they done with this army? With each new victory the final success seems more distant than ever. Before the passage of the Lease-Lend Act Germany had only Britain to reckon with, but a Britain made strangely tenacious because the whole Nazi policy had shown that there was no alternative except a fight to the end against Nazism. Before the invasion of Russia the Nazis had only Britain and America to reckon with. Now they have those powers combined with Russia—and China—in a working alliance which has not only created a new ideological unity, but which possesses an armament potential far above that of Nazified Europe. The Germans are in a war whose margin fades forever and forever as they move forward, a war that they cannot hope to win. For even if Russia is knocked out in the next six months (which seems unlikely), British and American strength will make a stalemate of it. And if Russia holds out and America enters the war, it must end in a Nazi defeat, a defeat for the most powerful single military force in modern times.

"What Hitler has done has been to brutalize and degrade Germany's very real economic and military strength. By his use of terrorism and propaganda he has quickly vanquished the nations of the European continent, but only to raise against him new and more powerful enemies and the conscience of the whole civilized world. By his treatment of the vanquished European peoples he has taught Europe the meaning of fascism and has solidified against himself an avenging hatred of all the European peoples which awaits only the cracking of the myth of Nazi invincibility before it causes the whole structure to crash. The Nazis are training their young men to be the rulers of a world they still hope to conquer. But it is a world whose conquest depends wholly on an interested lie. And while Hitler boasts that he is proceeding with his conquest with 'National Socialist thoroughness,' he has failed to reckon with the intangibles of the human spirit which will ultimately defeat him.

"When that defeat comes it will be seen that the whole Nazi house of cards is no stronger than the lie about human life on which Hitler has sought to build it. Today the divergent aristocracies of business, army, bureaucracy and party are held together by Hitler's own will and power and by the terror of the Gestapo. But when the fighting blood of the Nazis has been further drained in the Russian adventure, when blockade by sea and punishment by air have cut heavily into the armament potential, when America has sent steadily mounting streams of production against Hitler, then the top-heavy administrative system will itself crumble; and the fanatical belief of the German youth in the Nazi dream of world empire will give way to a bitter disillusionment.

"And then will come the problem of building a new Germany out of the ruins of the old. Germany will have to be disarmed in military terms; she will already have been disarmed economically by the heavy punishment given her industries in the war. She will have to start anew, no longer as a nation inflamed with a mission of world empire, but rather as part of a regional European economic unity and as a democratic people within the framework of a democratic world."

Thus might some spokesman of the silent common men and women in Germany address his nation. Part of our problem is that such a spokesman has not yet emerged. Until he does the latent energies of a democratic Germany will not find a voice.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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The Republicans Betray Defense

WE HAVE CONDEMNED America First for undermining our power to resist Hitler. It is time that we condemned also a far more powerful and dangerous group which, for its own narrow ends, is playing the same game. It is the band of Republican members of Congress organized under Minority Leader Joseph Martin.

The record of this group in opposing the extension of the draft, the arming of merchant ships and other vital defense measures is well known. The story of how, in secret session, it wrecked the emergency price-control bill has been kept under cover.

Of all defense necessities, price control is today the most urgent. If the Ordnance Division of the Office of Production Management fails to obtain production of the Oerlikon aircraft cannon, then our shipments of fighters may be delayed; if the Metals and Minerals Division fails to open up new copper mines, civilian users of copper may suffer. But if Leon Henderson fails to get price control and inflation overwhelms us, as it must, then the whole structure of our defense program and our economy may be badly crippled.

Yet for three vital months, while the forces of inflation have gathered strength in America, a small band of Republicans on the House Banking and Currency Committee, aided by a few Southern Democrats, have blocked every attempt to obtain price control.

In these three months, the cost of living has risen by two percent a month; the wholesale price rise of 22 percent since August, 1939, which for a time was held within the dealers' profits margins, has broken through into the retail markets, threatening the standard of all workers and, most of all, playing havoc with the lives of those unemployed because of industrial shifts due to defense. In twenty-six months foods have risen by 39 percent; textiles are expected to rise sharply before January; as defense production is redoubled, the prices of all consumer goods may become wildly disordered. All this means inflation and Henderson, fighting only by means of voluntary controls, is powerless to hold inflation back.

In a speech on November 5, John Hamm, deputy administrator of the OPM, gave a most urgent warning: "Our effectiveness is diminishing. As each day passes, we are confronted with more and more refined methods of circumventing our price schedules. . . . The fact that a minority of willful violators are not swiftly and properly punished lessens the willingness of others to coöperate in a voluntary program. Unless more effective tools are placed in our hands quickly, the degree of non-compliance is certain to increase. . . . To preserve the gains we have made and to extend our efforts to those areas where price action is urgently needed, we must have legislation."

Throughout July, the Office of Price Administration worked with all possible speed to prepare the emergency price-control bill. Henderson insisted that the powers granted to the OPA by the proposal be cut to the minimum in order that it could avoid delays in Congress. The bill, which was sent to Congress on August 3, was one of the most conservative ever written by the New Deal. In contrast to the priorities statute written by the OPM, which transferred to Stettinius power of life and death in industry and contained no standards of conduct, no statutory procedure and no guarantee of judicial review, the emergency price-control bill contained all of these limitations. The priorities statute passed through Congress almost without debate; the emergency price-control bill was sabotaged from beginning to end.

On August 5, the bill was referred to the House Banking and Currency Committee. Hearings were prolonged for three months as part of a delaying maneuver to permit prices to rise before the measure became law. In all this time, no criticism was made of the major provisions. Then the proposal was submitted to secret discussion in the executive session of the committee. In this session, which should have been limited by the terms of the hearing, the draft was cut to pieces. In many mean and unimportant amendments, the committee went out of its way to embarrass Henderson as price administrator. Henderson accepted the amendments without complaint. The committee then went on to strip all powers from Henderson's bill. It presented for debate in the House its own version—an emaciated and unworkable measure.

First, Henderson's bill was stripped of licensing provisions. These provisions, used by Herbert Hoover in the Enforcement Division of the Food Administration during the last war, were an indispensable part of the bill. They served as a means of control over violations which did not involve the violators in criminal proceedings. They provided simply that after the second violation of a price ceiling by a seller, the license issued to him by the OPA might be revoked. He could then have full recourse to judicial review up to the Supreme Court.

The striking out of this provision by the Banking and Currency Committee left only the costly and destructive recourse of criminal suits open to the OPA and made the measure almost unworkable.

The second provision struck out by the committee provided for the OPA to buy and sell commodities. This provision was again fully justified by our experi-

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ence in 1917 and by the practice of the British and Canadian governments in this war. It limited the possibility of speculation and it avoided the enormous excess profits which resulted from the bulk-line system by which, in the last war, prices were set at levels high enough to cover the costs of the least efficient producers. By making purchases from small high-cost producers at prices higher than those set for efficient producers by the price ceilings, the OPA intended to save millions of dollars in the defense program.

The third provision struck out by the committee was one which protected the consumer. It provided that any buyer forced to pay more than the ceiling price could sue the seller for an amount three times the overcharge. This provision, too, was written into the bill in the light of English experience. Without it, one of the most effective means of enforcement was lost.

By its fourth amendment, the Banking and currency Committee completely destroyed the usefulness of the bill. The original measure stabilized the most important of all prices—farm prices. As amended by the committee, in effect it made most of the ceilings upon farm prices inoperative. It provided that no price ceiling could be placed on any farm product until the price had reached the highest of one of three levels: the price on October 1, 1941; 110 percent of parity on the 1909-14 index; or the average price from 1919 to 1929.

On the basis of the 1909-14 index of 100, farm prices in August, 1939, stood at 92. On October 1, 1941, the first of the three criteria chosen in the amended version of the bill, farm prices had risen to 139. On the basis of the second criterion, 110 percent of the 1909-14 parity ratio of farm prices to other prices, farm prices on October 1 could have risen further to an index of 152 before price controls could have been established. On the basis of the third criterion, the 1919-29 index, the ceiling would have been applied also at an index of 152. If, as the amended version of the bill provided, the highest of these three criteria were taken for each farm commodity, the index of farm prices on October 1 could have risen 73 points above August, 1939, to 165 percent of the 1909-14 levels. For the 35,000,000 people in America who earn less than $1,000 a year, and who spend 40 percent of their income on food alone, this rise would be almost intolerable.

It was precisely this result which was desired by the Republican minority on the Banking and Currency Committee. The committee's ten Republican members voted as a bloc on each of the four major amendments by which the original bill was destroyed. They then voted as a bloc to place their amended bill on the floor of the House. The intention of Joseph Martin, who must have directed their votes, was very clearly to absolve the Republican Party from voting against price control on the floor of the House; to leave the administration with a bill which could not possibly prevent inflation; and then to make the high cost of living the issue of the 1942 elections. This interpretation is not exaggerated; it is believed by most of the responsible House leaders who speak for the administration.

Tragically enough, of the fourteen Democratic members who might have saved the bill, two were away, and three others played the Republicans' game. Mike Monroney of Oklahoma and Albert Gore of Tennessee did not wish to be caught voting against price control, and so they introduced a bill of their own, a version of Baruch's proposal which had no possible chance of acceptance. They then used it as a lever to oppose Henderson's bill. A third Democrat, Paul Brown of Georgia, served as the front for a notorious lobbyist, Tom Linder, the representative of Governor Talmadge. It was Brown who introduced and forced through, with the aid of the Republicans, the Thomas plan of the 1919-29 index for farm prices. He was fully backed by a bloc of Southern inflationists, which includes, in the Senate, "Cotton Ed" Smith of South Carolina, John H. Bankhead of Alabama and many other Senators. These men have only one interest at stake: high-priced cotton. Under the Thomas proposal, cotton may rise to more than 21 cents before a ceiling can be applied to it; for 21-cent cotton these few shortsighted men are ready to risk ruining the entire nation by inflation.

Normally, Bankhead, Brown and the group of Southern agriculturalists are regarded as the placid tools of the American Farm Bureau Federation. The Farm Bureau deserves as much of the blame as any group for the wrecking of the emergency price-control bill. Its greed for high farm prices was such that it was willing to abandon the entire conception of parity, from which it gained a new lease on life under Roosevelt, in order to snatch at the prizes which the Thomas proposal held out.

Because he came from a cotton state (Alabama), Henry Steagall, chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee, allowed the administration bill to be destroyed. He aided the Republicans further by attempting to send the substitute bill to the floor of the House. It was then, in the first week of November, that the President intervened. Deeply shocked by the irresponsibility of the committee members, the President told Steagall that the administration would denounce the bill if it came to debate.

Today, the future of the substitute bill is uncertain. It is to be hoped that it will be referred back to committee and replaced by the original bill. Meanwhile, four months have been lost—months in which inflation has fastened its hold upon us and the government has been powerless, held by the blind and narrow partisanship of men who have never believed that we are in danger, and who today are themselves the greatest source of danger to our democracy.

Washington MICHAEL STRAIGHT

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Russia Today

A Special Section

Homage to a Fighting People

THERE IS NO INTENT in the articles that follow to prettify the Russian scene. The achievement of the Russian people in making an almost incredibly effective and heroic stand against the full armed power of the Nazis has removed them from the need of prettification at our hands. What they need, far more, is study and understanding, without adornment and without malice. We need to know more about Russia, not only because she is today our most effective ally in the war against Nazism, but even more because in the period after a victory we shall need a firm understanding among America, Britain, Russia and China as the basis of world peace. If, unfortunately, it is Russia herself that has in the past placed bars against our attempts to understand her, the reasons for those bars have now been removed by her mortal peril and by the lesson she has learned that Nazism is the only enemy she need really fear.

In short, by Hitler's invasion Russia has been made to reënter our world. And yet to put it thus is to put it overbaldly. The physical fact of an invasion could never have effected so important a result unless the material for achieving that result had already been there. The notion, held in the best faith by many of our intellectuals in the past few years, that there was only a heads-or-tails difference between the Nazis and the Russians, has been dealt a death blow by the events since June, 1941. If Hitler had believed it, he would never have found it necessary to destroy Russia before turning on Britain and America with his full force. If the Russians had believed it, they could never have met him so fiercely in the defense not only of their land and crops and buildings, but of their ideas and their way of life. And if we ourselves had fully believed it, our present welcoming of Russian aid against Hitler and our celebration of Russian resistance would have been the sheerest and most vicious opportunism, of a sort to disgust our young people who ask not only for action but for action in defense of an ethos.

No, the fact is that the whole style of a culture is shown best in catastrophe. The style of Britain was revealed by the way the British people achieved unity after Dunkirk. And the style of the Russian culture is today revealed by the way in which workers and peasants and intellectuals are fighting and dying, by the scorched earth that is the only thing left in the wake of the slowly retreating Russian armies, by the massive patience and determination shown not only by the Russian people but by Stalin and the rest of the ruling group. There are aspects of Russia revealed to us now that we had never fully understood: that despite the lack of political democracy, the people are behind the government; that in the space of less than a quarter-century the nation has been pushed to a high pitch of industrialization; that the Russian people have not lost their deep sense of cultural nationalism.

And so instead of saying that it was Hitler's invasion that created these qualities in Russia, let us say that the invasion precipitated what was already there. At some point in history it was inevitable that the three deep strains of the present Russian culture should cross and fuse. Those strains are an almost mystical Russian nationalism that predates the Revolution and that can be found best in Tolstoy's deeply experienced novel, "War and Peace," the combination of humanism and toughness in the heritage of Marxian and Leninist doctrine, and the military, economic and administrative achievement of the Russian people since the Revolution. The historical point at which they crossed was June, 1941, and the occasion was the Nazi assault.

But what we have learned about Russia is less important for us than what we can learn from Russia. We are primarily interested not in Russia but in America. What we require is not, as many have contended, a revaluation of Marxism and the Russian Revolution in the light of recent events, but a revaluation of democracy. And to that our assessment of the Russian experience can contribute.

In the first place, what Russia is today doing should revive our belief in the capacity of a socialist state to be a strong state, strong in military and administrative terms, fit for survival in a harsh world.

Second, we should have learned that the spirit of a people can break through political forms even when those political forms are unfavorable and oppressive. But it can do so only when those people have been given a sense of participation in a process of social and economic construction. The great reason why the Russian people are fighting as they are is that they are

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fighting in defense of something they believed they themselves have had a hand in building, and something that they believe belongs to them. Our own democracy can take warning from that fact, and take heart.

Third, we should have learned that the strength of a culture is no greater than its capacity to evoke the energies and the allegiance of its young people. Observers tell us over and over again that Russia is run by her young people, that they do not, as so many of them do in our own country, have a sense of being unused.

What remains for us is not to take over this pattern, but to apply its lessons to our own needs. If we are to have a strong state it must be democratic and libertarian, as the Russian state is not. If we are to evoke a fighting faith it must be by planning from above and grass-roots democracy from below, by strong leadership at the center but also by the evocation of a democratic elite from the rank and file of our young people. To that task, with a sense both of what is wrong and right about the Russia of today, the democratic America of tomorrow can dedicate itself. MAX LERNER

The Kremlin's Foreign Policy

RUSSIA is often described as an enigma; and Winston Churchill has described Russia as an enigma wrapped in mystery. Yet the only enigmatic thing about the Russians is that, behind what Westerners regard as a veil of Oriental deceitfulness, they act exactly like other people. This, of course, is itself enigmatic if it is first assumed that the Russians will always act like characters in "The Cherry Orchard," periodically asking: "What shall we do about life?"—which they were forced to stop doing in 1917; or if it is assumed that they are going to act purely on the basis of Communist ideology as defined by Karl Marx—which they have not been doing to any extent since Lenin's death.

The appearance of deceitfulness that Russians have often given—in the days of the tsars as well as in the days of the Soviets—is owing partly to Russian suspicion of all foreigners, and a consequent desire to outmaneuver them; and partly to the fact that, except for a small upper class, Russia has lived outside the main stream of Western civilization and therefore acts on other than Western assumptions. This is baffling to people who make little effort to understand the non-Western point of view and expect the Russians to abide by their standards.

To understand Soviet foreign policy, it is not enough to analyze it in terms of Marxist ideology, as has frequently been done by our left-wing commentators. It must first be analyzed in terms of Russia's geography, history and economic development. No matter what may have been the philosophy of Lenin, Trotsky or Stalin, Soviet leaders could not escape the fact that they achieved power in a vast country of continental expanse, richly endowed with natural resources most of which have as yet been barely developed, but poor in industrial skills and transportation facilities, and almost wholly lacking in political experience. This country, to add to its difficulties, spans Europe and Asia, and is in the paradoxical position of being periodically disavowed by both civilizations. As a result, one of the basic trends in Russia's foreign policy for the past fifty years—under the tsars and under the Soviets—has been the effort to avoid a war on two fronts, with Germany in the west and Japan in the east.

Russia's problems are further complicated by the fact that her economic importance, both as an undeveloped market for manufactured goods and as a source of foodstuffs and raw materials, is a constant temptation for advanced industrial countries, which hope to find in Russia the "living space" formerly open in Africa, Asia and the Americas. This temptation is all the stronger because, in the course of their turbulent history, the Russians have seldom displayed those talents for organization which would indicate that they could industrialize the country without outside assistance. Such assistance was forthcoming before 1914, when French, British, American and other foreign interests invested capital in various Russian enterprises, notably railways and street-car systems, but was reduced practically to zero when the Soviet government, opposed to both foreign and domestic capitalism, seized power in 1917. From then on, it feared a concerted attack on "the first workers' republic in the world."

It was subject to these handicaps, inherent in Russian history and economy, that the Soviet government entered the lists of Europe's post-war diplomacy. Its principal obstacle, from the outset, was the profound hostility aroused in Western countries both by Bolshevik methods in Russia and by Moscow's sponsorship of the Third (Communist) International—a hostility which persisted in some circles even after Germany's invasion of Russia last June. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty, by which Germany in March, 1918, had wrested the western provinces of Russia from the Soviet government, was explicitly canceled by the Versailles Treaty. But the victorious Allies felt no more sympathy for the Soviet government than Imperial Germany had. On the ground first of saving Russia from Germany and then, following the Armistice, of saving Russia from communism, France, Britain, Japan and the United States assisted various White Russian leaders in campaigns against the Red Army in Northern Russia, Siberia, the Ukraine and the Crimea.

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Memories of this period, when all of Europe seemed girded for a crusade against communism, made the Soviet government equally suspicious of Germany and of the Allies. From its point of view, Russia had little to choose between the two sets of "imperialist" powers; and its policy for the next two decades might be expressed by the phrase: "a plague on both your houses." Its suspicions were increased during the Paris Peace Conference, to which Soviet Russia was not invited by the Allies. At that time the Allies recognized the independence of Russia's former provinces—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland—and created a Polish national state composed of Polish territories formerly divided among Prussia, Austria and Russia. The establishment of these buffer states had a double purpose: to prevent the spread of communist infection to the West, and to block a renewed German eastward drive.

Neither of these purposes was realized. The Soviet leaders, already inimical to private capitalism at home and abroad, were thrown back on their own resources and driven to develop a more or less self-sufficient economy by methods wasteful of both lives and materials. In an effort to break down the "sanitary cordon" drawn around it by the Allies, the Soviet government resorted to barter practices subsequently adopted and amplified by Nazi Germany. These practices, in turn, increased anti-Soviet sentiment abroad and provoked a campaign against "the Red trade menace." Through the Third International, Moscow simultaneously fostered unrest abroad, especially in countries which, either because of war weariness or nascent nationalism, seemed ripe for Communist revolution—notably Germany, Hungary and China.

When the collapse of short-lived Communist regimes in Hungary and Bavaria had demonstrated, in Lenin's words, that world revolution had faced a "false dawn," the Soviet government sharply altered its tactics. It set out to develop relations with all countries which seemed ready for negotiation, irrespective of their internal systems—among them Russia's World War enemies, Germany and Turkey, as well as Italy, where Mussolini had seized power in 1922 under the slogan of saving the country from bolshevism. Even in these early days of the revolution, dominated by concern with the affairs of the Communist International rather than with those of the Russian national state, the Soviet government came to terms with any foreign regime whose collaboration might serve Russia's interests.

Of all the relationships established by Moscow during that period, the most significant was its rapprochement with republican Germany, effected through the Rapallo treaty of 1922 which was signed at the Genoa Conference, where both Germany and Russia appeared to be outlaws from the European community of nations. German-Soviet collaboration was then supported by German industrialists and business men who, while hostile to communism at home, favored close relations with Russia, where they hoped to find an untapped market for manufactured goods as well as raw materials for German industry. It was also favored by the Reichswehr, which, although equally fearful of communism in Germany, hoped to establish on Soviet territory the armament factories and training cadres prohibited by the disarmament provisions of Versailles.

This favorable attitude of German business and military circles was in sharp contrast to the views of Hitler, who in 1923 had made the often quoted statement in "Mein Kampf" which received careful study in the Kremlin: "We take up at the halting place of six hundred years ago. We terminate the endless German drive to the south and west of Europe, and direct our gaze toward the lands in the east. We finally terminate the colonial and trade policy of the pre-war period, and proceed to the territorial policy of the future. But if we talk about new soil and territory in Europe today, we can think primarily only of *Russia* and its vassal border states."

These border states were the ones which the Paris Peace Conference had set up as a bulwark against Germany's eastward drive. They were occupied by Russia in the autumn of 1939, with Nazi acquiescence, after Britain and France, during their negotiations of that summer with Moscow, had opposed such a move. Unjustifiable as Russia's action may appear on other grounds, it must be admitted that the existence of this buffer area in June, 1941, gave Moscow an opportunity to mobilize its forces more adequately than might have otherwise been possible when Germany attacked.

The Soviet-German rapprochement of 1922, however, did not reassure the Soviet government, which continued to fear that the day would come when Germany would join forces with Britain and France for an attack on the USSR. So the Kremlin sought "reinsurance" against such a contingency by striving to improve its relations with the Western powers, especially France, and with its border states to west and east. It also made a determined effort to relegate the Third International to the background (no meetings of the Comintern were held between 1928 and 1935); entered the League of Nations in 1934, shortly after Germany's departure from Geneva, with the aid of France, which by that time was beginning to be alarmed by the resurgence of the Reich; and launched a campaign to rally all anti-Fascist elements in Western countries, irrespective of their political and economic views, in a popular front against fascism.

As Germany, under Hitler, won one diplomatic victory after another, Moscow intensified its efforts to develop relations with the Western powers. The principal advocate of this orientation was Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Foreign Commissar who, unlike most of Stalin's adherents, had lived abroad before 1914 and could be described as a "westerner" and an "internationalist." The culminating point of Litvinov's efforts was reached

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in 1935, when the Soviet government signed five-year pacts of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia. The conclusion of these pacts which, according to the Nazis, threatened to encircle Germany, was the pretext for Hitler's denunciation on March 16, 1936, of the Locarno Treaties, and of his simultaneous remilitarization of the Rhineland, in defiance of the Versailles Treaty. Acceptance of this *fait accompli* by Britain and France caused the Soviet government to reëxamine its Western orientation. The "appeasement" policy of the Western powers, taken in conjunction with the conclusion in November, 1936, of the anti-Comintern pact by Germany and Japan, made Moscow just as suspicious of the Allies as of Nazi Germany.

The Soviet government made no immediate official move to dissociate itself from the Western powers. On the contrary, M. Litvinov continued to use Geneva as a forum for Moscow's demands that the League should take measures of collective security. Internal developments in the USSR, however, indicated the direction in which the wind might blow. Some observers believed that the drastic purges of 1936-37, which eliminated many Old Bolsheviks and leading army officers on the ground that they had plotted with Germany and Japan to overthrow the Stalin regime and dismember the Soviet Union, were determined primarily by anti-German sentiment. It would seem more accurate to say that the spectacular Moscow trials reflected a widespread outburst of xenophobia—mistrust of all foreigners. The immediate result was to increase Russia's isolation, both because Russians became almost morbidly fearful of contacts with foreigners, and because the trials alienated many Soviet sympathizers abroad.

From this isolation the Soviet government briefly emerged during the civil war in Spain, when it openly intervened on the side of the Loyalists, but only after it had been established that Germany and Italy were assisting General Franco.

The reluctance of the Western powers to interfere with Italo-German activities in Spain created the belief in Moscow that the French and British governments, whatever their public protestations, were at heart sympathetic to Hitler's thesis that Nazism was a bulwark against communism. This belief was reinforced by the Munich accord, under which France and Britain obliged Czecho-Slovakia to accept Germany's demands for cession of Sudetenland. Not only did France and Britain acquiesce in the terms of the Munich accord. They also appeared, as seen from Moscow, to have agreed with Hitler and Mussolini that the Soviet Union should be excluded once and for all from Europe's diplomatic councils. This, in turn, revived Moscow's latent fear of "capitalist encirclement" by all the Western powers combined. To this moment may be traced the origins of German-Soviet negotiations for a non-aggression pact which, according to the best available information, were probably undertaken at Moscow's initiative in January, 1939, shortly before Hitler entered Prague, and thus before Chamberlain, shocked by this development, had given his April, 1939, guarantee to Poland, Rumania, Greece and Turkey.

What particularly troubles left-wing commentators —who after years of uncritical admiration of the Soviet Union have in many cases become its fiercest critics— is not that the USSR, after Munich, opened negotiations with Hitler but that, after Prague, it proceeded on this course as if the Allies had not undergone a change of heart. Some of these critics contend that the Soviet government, by coming to terms with Germany in August, 1939, betrayed its own support of collective security, and did this not because it feared another Munich (at the expense of Poland and Russia) but, on the contrary, because it feared that the Allies were no longer in a mood to appease Germany and that the Soviet Union might thus have to fight the Reich.

Every commentator is entitled to his own interpretation of events which remain obscure and on which we do not yet possess sufficient trustworthy information. But what must be borne in mind is that the Soviet government, rightly or wrongly, remained distrustful of the Allies even after Prague. The Soviet leaders thought that Britain's pledges to Poland and Rumania represented not a real change of heart, but an underhanded attempt to drag the Soviet Union into a war with Germany in which the Allies would leave to Hitler the task of demolishing communism. This fear appeared fantastic to many in France and Britain once the Western powers had decided to check Hitler. It must be remembered, however, that the Soviet government, during the two decades of its existence, had had little reason to regard the Allies as friendly powers; and it is difficult to argue that Moscow "betrayed" the Allies unless it is admitted, in the same breath, that the Allies had "betrayed" Moscow at Munich.

Moreover, the Soviet government was aware that Russia's industrial system, which had proved unable to supply the peacetime needs of the population, would be unequal to the strain of a war with Germany. It also knew that the Red Army, no matter how great its manpower and morale, would be hard put to fight, alone, the highly mechanized German forces backed by the Reich's efficient industry. What the Kremlin wanted, above all, was to prevent Germany and Japan from coming within striking distance of the USSR. If war could not be prevented, it hoped to divert the main thrust of both German and Japanese expansion from Russia to the territories and possessions of the Western powers. The Soviet government had not been interested in "collective action" against aggressors, as has often been contended, since such action threatened to involve it in war with Germany, or Japan, or both. What it wanted were measures of "collective security," which might conceivably have checked aggression before it occurred and thus shielded Russia against a

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major war which, in the opinion of Soviet leaders, was bound to jeopardize their system. It was with this hope in mind that the Soviet government signed a pact of non-aggression with Hitler in August, 1939. When it became convinced, after the Balkan campaign, that war with Germany might prove unavoidable, it signed a pact of neutrality with Japan in April, 1941, hoping at least to prevent a war on two fronts.

As it turned out, the Kremlin, no less than France and Britain, had underestimated Germany's military power. Temporarily freed by the Soviet non-aggression pact from fear of a two-war front, Hitler concentrated his forces in the west. He was thus able, by the summer of 1941, to bring back to the east the bulk of his armies, seasoned meanwhile by experience in modern warfare. According to Hitler's proclamation of June 22, the invasion of Russia had been urged by the German General Staff, which feared a Russian stab in the back in case Germany undertook an invasion of Britain. While this may be true, it must be recalled that Hitler had steadfastly adhered, since 1923, to the idea of building a German empire on the Continent, first of all at the expense of Russia and her border states, in the hope that eastward expansion would avoid the clash over colonies and naval power which, in his opinion, had brought Imperial Germany into conflict with Britain.

Today, as in 1914-17, Russia is once more fighting in collaboration with the Western powers, having returned, through force of circumstances determined by her geography, her history and her economic development, to the foreign policy of the tsars. Whatever may be the outcome of the Soviet-German war, Russia may be expected to emerge from the conflict with a political and economic system profoundly altered by the necessity of placing armed power in the hands of the people as a whole and by the simultaneous necessity of establishing closer contacts with the West. It is impossible to believe that, after this war, Russia can be excluded from the councils of Europe.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Prospects for the Red Army

THE SOVIET-GERMAN war is proving to be a long one and the Soviet Union is the ally of the democracies for the duration. The struggle will be carried on, even should Moscow and the entire Leningrad-Moscow-Donets-Basin line fall. The Soviet Union is quite capable of waging war behind this line. The German advance has occupied less than one-thirtieth of the Soviet Union. East of the Leningrad-Moscow-Donets-Basin line there is a population far in excess of 100,000,000, with important economic resources. The whole Russian strategy shows that this is no war that can be swiftly ended. It is a life-and-death struggle, with no quarter asked. The ruthless scorched-earth policy, the participation of the civilian population, the existence of a People's Army besides the regular Red Army, the tenacious guerrilla warfare in the attacker's rear—all this shows an iron determination to use every means of defense, to wage the war to a conclusion.

On the eve of the German invasion, the peacetime strength of the Red Army amounted to approximately two and a half million men. The mobilization of twelve age-groups gave the Red Army some eight to ten million soldiers. Altogether the Red Army has some twelve million trained reserves, of which five to six millions are fully trained (having passed through long terms of service with the cadre divisions of the Red Army). The total arms-bearing population of the Soviet runs from twenty to twenty-five millions. The loss of the occupied regions has meant only a relatively small impairment of the Red Army's reserves in manpower. By far the greater part of the male population of arms-bearing age was evacuated.

Nevertheless, the importance of the numerical factor in favor of the Red Army must not be exaggerated. Part of both the Red Army effectives and reserves are tied down in the Far East because of the Japanese menace. The Third Reich is waging the war against the Soviet Union as a war of coalition, ruthlessly utilizing even the full force of its vassals. With its allies (Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, Finland), the Third Reich can draw on a total population of almost 150,000,000—more than the Soviet Union has, if the occupied regions are subtracted. Should Japan attack the Soviet Union, belligerent Russia, in a two-front war in Europe and Asia, would be in a position of numerical inferiority as far as manpower reserves are concerned.

Before the German invasion, the Red Army was based on an extraordinarily strong and productive war economy. Before the outbreak of the Second World War, Soviet arms production actually exceeded the German. The total output of Soviet machine construction was greater than that of Germany. But during the course of the war, the German war economy has outdistanced the Soviet. The German economy was completely mobilized for war. The Russians, while considerably increasing arms output in the years 1939-41, waited for the outbreak of war before completely mobilizing their economy. The Third Reich, on the other hand, gained control by conquest of the raw-material resources, the machine-construction facilities and the reserve stocks of the entire European continent. Had the Soviet Union entered the war as early as 1939, it would have been waging war under more favorable economic conditions than today. Yet even in June,

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1941, the Red Army's arms accumulation was, by and large, not behind that of the Germans'.

This is how the possible losses must be calculated: Along the lower Dnieper, in the Donets Basin, in the Moscow and Leningrad industrial regions—the regions that are already lost or in peril—altogether some 50 percent of Russian iron ore, coal and iron production and 65 percent of machine construction are concentrated. Since August, however, Russian machine-building equipment has been steadily transferred into the safe eastern zones. Thus, even if worst comes to worst, the Soviet Union will lose but part of its machine construction with the occupied regions. True, the reorganization of the transferred industries will take time, and work is not likely to be resumed without difficulties. But the very operation shows the thoroughness with which the Soviet Union is preparing for sustained defense. Russian armament industry proper, on the other hand, has suffered far less from territorial losses. It had been centered in advance much further eastward than heavy industry and machine construction. The biggest threat to Russian war production springs not from any shrinkage in the armament industry, but from a crisis in the raw-material supply. This may result in Germany's having a dangerous arms superiority.

In technical quality the weapons of the Red Army have proved themselves quite up to the mark. In not a single arms category have the Germans shown any conspicuous technical superiority. The Red Army's infantry arms and artillery of all calibers are especially good. According to the reports of British and American experts who have visited the Soviet Union during the present war, Russian military aircraft is able to hold its own with British and American types. Russian fast and heavy tanks are superior to the Nazis'.

The four and a half months of the war have shown the qualities of the Red Army. It possesses unmatched endurance and high morale. It has full command of all modern weapons. The work of the Russian artillery and air force is on a particularly high level. The Red Army has thoroughly mastered the tactical art of modern battle. Its officers and men are trained in all tactical situations of modern warfare. There cannot be the slightest doubt that in this respect the Red Army has shown a vast superiority, compared to the French and British armies. It has mastered one of the most difficult techniques of modern warfare—coöperation among the different arms branches, an art in which it alone, of all the armies of the world except the German, has proved itself. Its performance in the field of modern defense in the battles of Smolensk and Moscow, the two greatest battles of the war—and of military history—has been excellent. Only the Red Army has so far been able to engage the infantry masses of the Germans in major battles, imposing tremendous losses on the enemy. After four and a half months of the Soviet-German war, the Nazis have lost approximately 2,500,000 men—about ten times as many as in all the preceding campaigns of the Second World War. The experience of the eastern campaign has effectively refuted the view of the Red Army formerly shared by most military experts, namely, that it must rely solely on numbers and massed arms, that it was no more than a crudely organized mob. On the contrary, the Red Army has shown its capacity for fighting in dispersed order, in small units, under conditions of encirclement, and for using so-called "sly tactics."

The Red Army has proved itself capable of waging a long-drawn-out war. It has proved that it is in no way inferior to the German army in combat quality. Its retreat to Moscow does not in itself constitute proof of weakness. In mobile warfare the stabilization of fronts is improbable until the attacker is exhausted.

The Red Army's weaknesses do not lie in the field of arms or tactical failure. In the war against the Third Reich there has been no recurrence of the shortcomings exhibited in the first phase of the Finnish war—limited individual initiative, especially among the smaller units. Since 1939 it has made considerable progress, especially in the field of tactical training. On several occasions during tactical exercises in 1940, Timoshenko, then Commissar for Defense, subjected the performance of the troops to serious criticism. Training was not always uniform. Coöperation between infantry and artillery often did not come off. The element of calculation was lacking in operations. These defects were less in evidence in the present war. The real failure of the Red Army in this battle has been its inadequate capacity for launching counter-offensives, even though the combat morale of the troops was high and there was a sufficient supply of arms. The Red Army simply has not succeeded in launching a great counter-maneuver. It has so far been inferior to the Germans in strategic initiative and combat order—the cohesion of the larger units. Unfortunately, in mobile warfare failure to launch counter-maneuvers inevitably leads to a retreat. On the central and northern front the German advance was on three occasions arrested in major battles—those of Smolensk, Leningrad and Moscow; but in the south there was a continued retreat without defensive battles—though the defense of Odessa and the Crimea unquestionably amounted to local operations of great merit. Unhappiest of all for the Red Army was the Ukrainian campaign. The crisis of Russian strategy began with the German break-through on the lower Dnieper, during which neither the northern group of Budenny's army nor the central front launched counter-maneuvers.

The Russian war plan undoubtedly proceeded from the intention of forcing a protracted war on the Third Reich, of waging the first phase of the war defensively, of exhausting the enemy and then preparing the counter-offensive. This plan is especially adapted to block the enemy's concentrated offensive power. It is an alto-

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gether realistic plan, and its realization depends on two factors—the defense of vital Soviet centers and the aid given by the allies of the USSR. The Red Army is the strongest land army in the camp of the anti-Hitler coalition. It is the only army in the Allied camp capable of conducting a great continental offensive. The defensive capacity of the Red Army has been demonstrated. Its capacity for a counter-offensive is likely to grow in proportion to the German army's weakening and exhaustion. Despite all its successes and territorial gains, this army is in a critical state. It is now almost one thousand miles from its base of operations in eastern Germany. Its supply problem has become complicated and its losses are beginning to hurt. In the First World War the German army lost seven million men in all. On the Russian front Germany's losses have on the average been *four* times as great as losses on all fronts for the same period of time in the First World War. The German army is likely to reach the limits of its effectiveness when and if the present losses are doubled.

The most important weakening of the Soviet Union's military strength does not at present spring from the losses in manpower and territory. It springs from the damage to the Russian war economy. Here is the critical point for the Red Army. Yet its chances must not be evaluated in a vacuum. They are functions of the war of coalition. The first condition for enabling the Red Army to make the transition to the offensive is sufficient aid in both arms and supplies from the Allies.

There is the question of military relief too. Hitler is not only hurling all his own forces against the Soviet Union; he is also conducting a war of coalition. Thus Hitler got more out of his ally, Finland, which has in effect closed the port of Murmansk to British and American shipments, than the Red Army during the same time got from the British army. In the immediate future the Red Army's perspectives will be in part determined by whatever action the Anglo-American naval and air forces and the British army may undertake.

MAX WERNER

The Question of Liberty

It is a hazardous undertaking to appraise the character of civil liberties in a country which is admittedly a single-party dictatorship, and yet one that in its Constitution uses the phrases of democratic liberties and in its economic structure has abolished the restraints on liberty characteristic of capitalism. It is even more hazardous for anyone to indulge in long-distance judgments *thirteen* years removed from first-hand inquiry. Yet the documents, reports and constant contacts with observers of varied view freshly returned, do not alter the essential pattern which has marked the Soviet dictatorship, particularly from the years of the liquidation of the Trotskyist opposition.

It would be easy to dismiss all discussion of civil liberties in the Soviet Union simply by saying that they do not exist as we rate them; that the personal will of one man, the GPU and the censorship are so all-controlling as to permit no such liberties whatever. In the sense that we conceive freedom of speech, press and assembly as the right to oppose the government, to form an opposition party, and to turn out the administration in power, civil liberties of course cannot exist under a dictatorship.

But the case of the Soviet Union is not so simple as that. For civil liberties, unless narrowly construed, include all the complex rights of association and criticism identified with industrial democracy—as conceded now, for instance, in the United States under the National Labor Relations Act. In a larger sense they include freedom from racial discrimination, autonomy of national minorities, sex equality and the right of the community to regulate or own the instruments of production and distribution. It is only in these respects and within the framework of a political dictatorship that civil liberty in the Soviet Union can be discussed.

Even so, it may of course be urged that such aspects of liberty are quite apart from liberty's indispensable function of affording a means of peaceful change, and that the Soviet Union has entrenched a political tyranny beyond the power of change except by revolution. But that argument, while apparently well supported by evidence, ignores factors peculiar to Soviet history, to its economy, and to its relation to the outside world, factors which may conceivably afford a basis for change toward democratic institutions.

The revolution of 1917 undertook the almost impossible task of accomplishing in the most backward country of Europe what had been accomplished by the Reformation of the sixteenth century, the French Revolution of the eighteenth and the industrial revolution of the nineteenth, and to add to them the socialist revolution of the twentieth. This daring experiment was attempted in a country accustomed for centuries to a highly centralized tyrannical system of government, utterly alien to western democracy. The Soviet regime followed the established pattern. As a distinguished American once remarked, "Revolutions seem to change everything but the form of government."

The Soviet republic was founded on ideas diametrically opposed to those which inspired the republics of the west. These originated in the economics of laissez-faire; in the theory that that government is best which

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governs least; that a Bill of Rights is intended to protect citizens against arbitrary government; and that the state should hold to minimum interference with private business.

The Soviet republic, however, organized the state as the declared instrument for the achievement of a socialist, and ultimately classless, society. The interests of the government were regarded as identical with the interests of the individual citizen. That government was best which controlled most; protection of citizens against it was inconceivable. In this spirit the Soviet state openly declared itself to be a dictatorship of the proletariat. The industrial working class, a small minority in a peasant land, was regarded as the vanguard of socialist transformation. The Communist Party, a tiny minority, was seen as the vanguard of the working class. The government was subordinate to the party. Western concepts of political freedom and civil liberties clearly had no place in minority rule so conceived.

The 1936 Soviet Constitution uses the phrase of civil liberty, but strictly within this concept. It says, "In accordance with the interest of the toilers and for the purpose of strengthening the social system the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed (a) freedom of speech, (b) freedom of the press, (c) freedom of assembly and meetings, (d) freedom of street processions and demonstrations." The state—that is, the party dictatorship—alone has the prerogative of determining what is "in accordance with the interests of the toilers" and "strengthening the socialist system." Any activity or expression declared to be at variance with these interests is not tolerated.

But in spite of this utter lack of political democracy, the evidence over many years reveals a form of industrial democracy which gives fairly free play to critical faculties, but solely in the interest of making the socialist system work. Recent reports from dispassionate sources (and they exist) indicate that a Soviet factory worker may still get up in a production conference and denounce the factory manager as a thief, a bungler or a slave driver. He may, without fear of penalty, demand the manager's removal. Workers have often caused the removal of their bosses. This form of criticism is exercised not only at factory meetings, but in the newspapers, and in complaints to party and government bodies. The Soviet citizen thus has apparently a substantial voice in correcting immediate grievances on his job. But the evidence is equally convincing that if he questions basic government or party politics, or criticizes the top-flight leaders, severe penalties will swiftly follow. The GPU is omnipresent and relentless in scotching such opposition. Workers have long since learned where the line is drawn.

The pressure on the government from below, from the masses of workers and peasants, concerns only the administration of measures already established at the top. Criticism of this sort is freely published in the press; none of basic policies. Although the newspapers are frankly propaganda organs of the government, they print surprisingly unbiased foreign news, as any examination of the leading papers, Pravda and Izvestia, reveals. A Russian citizen has at his disposal nearly as much objective foreign information as an American.

Like foreign news, foreign newspapers, books and films are at the disposal of the Soviet citizen. Charlie Chaplin's "City Lights" and "Modern Times" played to crowded movie houses all over the USSR for years; Celine's "Journey to the End of the Night" and Dreiser's "American Tragedy" were best sellers. But all such material tends to be selected to make the Soviet citizen feel that he is relatively well off, and to prevent ideas critical of the government from entering his head. Despite that precaution, Soviet citizens may buy short-wave radio receivers and listen freely to foreign broadcasts. It is reliably reported that the only time the Soviet government employed jamming as a method of censorship was during the Russo-Finnish war. Apparently what goes on abroad is considered relatively harmless to the government.

In sharp contrast, domestic news in the press and on the air is always carefully edited to fit the policies of the government. Not a word of adverse comment or of news hostile to the government's purposes is ever printed. Substantially the same control affects public meetings, movies and books. Freedom of expression is limited to criticism of administration and approval of basic policies. The press and radio commonly publicize thousands of expressions of approval from workers and peasants all over the country whenever a new policy is launched, as was done upon the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact in August, 1939.

Travel is difficult for Soviet citizens, doubtless both for economic and political reasons. Restrictions, according to all reports, have become tighter in recent years. With the exception of certain border regions, the whole of the Soviet Union is in theory open for travel. But adults must carry a passport at all times. Railway tickets are difficult to obtain. Employees may not leave their jobs except when they are sent on specific missions. Travel abroad is virtually impossible except for those engaged in diplomatic or governmental missions.

Religious freedom is evidently today precisely what it has been from the beginning—confined exclusively to the right to worship, and to a clergy whose sole function is the performance of religious rites. Religious schools have been abolished; religious instruction of youth is prohibited; no social activities of the churches are permitted. Religious believers are not admitted to the governing party or to the Communist Youth organizations. Anti-religious propaganda has been persistently encouraged by the government. Thousands of priests of the old Orthodox Church have been "liquidated," allegedly for engaging in activities subversive of the regime. The origins of such severe restraints on

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religious freedom are to be found in the political character of the old state church, headed by the Tsar, and the vast superstitions it encouraged. A government committed to science, socialism and dictatorship was bound to regard the established church as the enemy of its interests, and to confine it, and other religions as well, to the politically innocuous role of worship.

But though religious freedom is thus restricted for political reasons, the government has found from the beginning every reason to encourage the cultural and racial freedom of the scores of national minorities of the Soviet Union. All observers, however hostile, are agreed on that. While race discrimination is severely punished, and the national minorities, constituting more than half of the population, are given full equality with Russians in political and economic life, control is of course vested in the Communist Party in each national republic.

Women in the Soviet Union enjoy, by constitutional right and in practice, equality with men. All professions and careers, including government posts, are open to them. The Soviet Union has women ambassadors, sea captains, flyers, industrial and farm managers, judges and people's commissars—to a degree probably greater than in any other country.

These aspects of Soviet personal and group liberties may be dismissed as relatively unimportant in the face of a political dictatorship from the top down, imposing its shifting policies on a vast peasantry without consultation, dealing with the trade unions as tools of politics and permitting no opposition whatever to function. But in so far as they are on the right side, they satisfy needs so insistent that in the changing balance sheet they have remained a constant factor on the credit side.

A fair judgment on the capacity of the Soviet Union to develop, short of revolution, the democratic institutions to which it pays lip service must obviously be based principally on the character of the governing party. The theory of the single-party state is that the Communist Party alone represents the "interests of the workers" and is alone capable of leading them toward socialism.

The one-party system is based on a rigorous internal discipline of its members and their unquestioning adherence to the party line as established by the Political Bureau, a body of thirteen, of which Stalin is the undisputed leader. All other official governmental bodies are mere window-dressing. All decisions rest with these men. Individual party members do not question or criticize Politburo decisions—and continue to exist. Political groupings in the party are strictly forbidden. Stalin and the Politburo are buttressed by the lower party organizations which, when necessary, are blamed for any miscarriage of a Politburo policy. When forced collectivization of agriculture, ordered by the Politburo, threatened in 1929 to shake the economic structure of the Soviet Union, countless lower party functionaries were removed and often punished for excesses while the Politburo blandly reversed its policy. It would thus appear that the monolithic party structure, about which the facts are acknowledged, offers little opportunity for change from within, except as events force its controlling heads to alter policies.

Even more effective than party discipline, enforced by expulsions—and worse—is the universal surveillance of the NKVD, the right arm of the government. A secret political police has existed in the Soviet Union since its inception, modeled on the Tsar's hated Okhrana, and known successively as the Cheka, the OGPU and now the NKVD. Vested with enormous powers of arrest, trial and punishment, and aided by an army of professional and volunteer informers, the secret police penetrates every Soviet and party organization, including the army and navy. It apprehends and delivers to its own "courts" all persons conceived to be enemies of the regime. Only a small minority of those arrested are tried in public. The vast majority are tried *in camera* and often *in absentia*. Exile and death have been the fate of thousands tried only in secret and apparently often without knowledge of specific charges.

It is a reasonable conclusion that, in spite of so tyrannical a dictatorship, the masses of the Soviet Union not unwillingly accept, for lack of an alternative, the government they have. The incessant propaganda for socialism and against foreign enemies, the huge task of building up an industrialized economy in a peasant land, the lack of unemployment, the satisfaction of nationalistic and cultural needs, the constant pressure of a program of achievement, and unfamiliarity with any alternative system of government —all contribute to the ignoring of those liberties so vital to progressive change in the democracies.

Thirteen years ago, after a few months of intensive inquiry in the Soviet Union, I published a report on "Liberty under the Soviets," coming to the conclusion that, despite the dictatorship, sufficient economic and other liberties existed to create the necessary growing-points for change toward ultimate democracy. Events since, particularly the purges and their aftermath, convinced me that the processes of change were blocked, and that no basis for inner peaceful transformation to a socialist democracy remained. The forced participation of the Soviet Union in the war, however, now offers a new basis for international influences toward that transformation, dependent, like democratic progress in other countries, on the organization of the peace. If the forces represented by our imperfect democracies survive, the Soviet Union, whatever its immediate fate in the war, seems likely to follow more closely the pattern of the western world to which it is in part committed by its own tentative professions of belief.

ROGER N. BALDWIN

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The Results of the Five Year Plans

THE THREE FIVE YEAR PLANS (1928-42) have radically changed the economic and social aspect of the Soviet Union. Failure to recognize this important fact has given rise to many misconceptions about the USSR.

The basic task of the First Five Year Plan (1928-32) was the rehabilitation of the nation's economy, which had been disrupted by the war and the revolution, and the speediest possible industrialization of the country. With this end in view, it was decided to restrict the development of those branches of the economy which produced consumption goods and to concentrate upon the development of capital-goods industries. According to the authors of the Second Five Year Plan (1933-37), its basic contention was "the liquidation of all exploiting classes and the abolition of the causes which gave rise to exploitation." Actually, the chief task of the Soviet government in the period of the Second Five Year Plan was the liquidation of peasant opposition and the completion of rural collectivization. The task of the Third Five Year Plan (1938-42) was to "complete the construction of a classless socialist society and to accomplish the gradual transition from socialism to communism." The third plan has especially emphasized the problem of raising the defensive strength of the nation. At the same time, it, like the preceding one, projected "a gigantic program for raising the material and cultural level of the laboring masses."

The Third Five Year Plan, which was to be completed by the end of 1942, was interrupted by the outbreak of the Russo-German war. However, the achievements of the three plans may now be estimated.

By the beginning of the Second World War, Russia had developed from the economically backward, primarily agricultural country of tsarist times into an industrially developed nation with strong tendencies toward rapid cultural progress. The percentage of the working population engaged in industry rose from 5 percent to more than 40 percent in 1939, and the percentage of national income derived from industry rose from 40 percent in 1913 to 70.7 percent in 1940.

The plans projected a tremendous expansion in industrial production. The first plan outlined an increase in industry from 18,000,000,000 rubles to 43,000,000,000. The second increased it to 102,000,000,000, and the third to 180,000,000,000. Official Soviet data claim that the First Five Year Plan was achieved 100.2 percent, and that the second was only 7.1 percent short of the projected quota. The Soviet estimates in terms of the 1926-27 ruble are not very reliable, and the data on the fulfilment of the plans are far too optimistic. But the proposed rate of expansion was so grandiose that the achievement of 90 percent, or even of 60 percent, of the plan was tremendously significant.

Much more exact are the reports on the rates of growth in the separate branches of industry. The quota for coal was fulfilled 85 percent during the first plan, 101 percent during the second, and 105 percent during the third; the quota for steel was achieved 57 percent during the first plan, 93 percent during the second, and only 62 percent during the third; machine construction was fulfilled 84 percent of the quota during the first, 90 percent during the second, and 102 percent during the third plan; production of cotton textiles reached 58 percent of the quota during the first, 55 percent during the second, and 52 percent during the third.

According to the plans, capital-goods industries were of first importance. The annual expansion of capital-goods industries was 30.8 percent during the first plan, 18.9 percent during the second, and 15.2 percent during the third. The annual expansion of consumption-goods industries was 17.6 percent during the first plan, 14.9 percent during the second, and 11 percent during the third.

The more than sevenfold increase in industrial production during the period of 1928-40 is an unparalleled phenomenon in world economics. It was possible only through the nationalization of industry, total economic planning and the unprecedented percentage of national savings channeled into long-range investments. While ordinarily such investments in other countries average no more than 6 percent of the national income, in the Soviet Union they have reached 22-28 percent.

By 1940 the output of productive machinery, which the plan developed with particular speed, reached 61 percent of the total output. The production of coal increased 5.6 times; steel, 5 times; machinery, 32 times, over that of pre-Soviet days.[1] The rapid rate of industrial growth has continually given rise to disproportionate development among the various branches of industry, creating disparities between available fuel and the demands of industry, between the mining of ore and the smelting of pig iron, between the production of metal and machine construction, between transport and industry, and so on. In addition to the expansion of old industries, new industries were constantly being developed, such as electro-technical, machine-tool, motor-construction, chemical and defense.

Old Russia had only three industrially developed centers, the Petersburg and Moscow districts, and the Ukraine, containing 90 percent of Russia's industry. The only other industrial regions were the Baku oil fields and the Ural mining districts.

More than 55 percent of all allocations for new construction were directed in recent years to districts on

[1] Although Soviet statistical reports are frequently exaggerated, the general trends shown are correct. — A. J.

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the Volga, in the Urals, the Caucasus, and Siberia. Vast industrial enterprises with a complete cycle of production and new parallel defense industries have been planned in Siberia and the Urals. This program was not fully completed by the beginning of the Russo-German war, but a considerable part of the new enterprises have already begun to function.

New metallurgic and machine-construction plants, new mines and electric stations have been opened in Siberia, in the Urals, on the Volga. By the end of the Second Five Year Plan, the eastern regions, *i. e.,* the Urals and regions east of them, produced 29.5 percent of the national steel output, 25 percent of its machines and 43 percent of its coal. The newly built industrial plants are all situated east of the Volga.

Compulsory collectivization and the abolition of the incentives of private economy were responsible for the uneven development of agricultural production. However, the establishment of collective farming on a firmer and sounder basis, and concessions to the peasants allowing them small individual farm plots, have resulted in a gradually rising level of production; both the percentage of mechanized agriculture and the technical level of production have become higher. Instead of 26,000,000 scattered petty farms, by 1938 there were in the USSR 242,000 collectives embracing 94 percent of all farms and 99 percent of the total area under cultivation. Today 80 percent of the land is tilled by tractors instead of the old primitive wooden plows. Combines and threshing machines have taken the place of scythes and flails. The gradually disappearing forms of extensive cultivation are giving way to intensive farming. Large-scale farming, mechanization, scientific husbandry, and large investments in tractors, combines, etc., have created favorable economic conditions for the rapid and stable development of agriculture. Fluctuations of yield and chronic crop failures have decreased considerably in recent years. The average annual grain harvest rose from 676,000,000 centners (a centner equals 100 pounds) in the five years 1910-14, inclusive, to 945,000,000 during 1933-37, and to 1,120,000,000 during 1938-41. The output of cotton in 1938 was 2.6 times that of 1913, that of sugar beets 1.5 times, and of oil-yielding crops twice that of 1913. Livestock, greatly diminished during the years of compulsory collectivization, also increased, and today exceeds the total that existed before the Great War.

All agricultural machinery belongs to the state's Machine-Tractor Stations, which do the work for the collectives for payment in kind. More than 40 percent of the gross agricultural output is taken by the state through compulsory taxes and levies in kind, and is used for food supplies for the army and the cities, for laying in reserves and for export. Moreover, the state, as priority buyer, purchases almost 70 percent of all commodities at fixed prices, the low level of which is the chief reason for peasant discontent.

A planned economy in the full sense of the word has not been achieved. The struggle between planning and chaotic market manifestations is far from concluded. But the elements of planning in the USSR grow from year to year, and state control is becoming an ever more decisive factor in the national economy. The collectives and the peasants are permitted to sell their "surplus," but in fact all trade, including that of collective farms, is under state control. The system of monopoly in foreign trade has been consolidated and has become an instrument of Soviet foreign-trade policy.

All financial institutions are in the hands of the state. Accumulation of wealth by the state is carried out not so much by means of taxes as through the price mechanism: the state, the monopolist of all trade, sets prices at levels which will yield the greatest share of its revenue. In recent years 60-65 percent of the budget was derived from this indirect "turnover tax."

The change in the Soviet social structure has been equally radical. The old owning classes, the capitalists and landowners, have disappeared. Some remnants of these classes are still hiding in the nooks and crannies of the regime, but they play no role in the life of the land. The working class has increased numerically, comprising 49.7 percent of the population in 1939 as compared with 16.6 percent in 1913. The number of government employees has risen greatly and their importance in the government apparatus has increased. The overwhelming majority of the peasantry works on collective farms in the position of semi-laborers, semi-peasants. Two souls still struggle in the peasant—that of the petty proprietor dreaming of his own farm, and that of the economically progressive worker in the collective. Individual peasants are disappearing and today represent only five percent of the total population.

During the first years of the Five Year Plans the material conditions of workers, both in town and village, were very difficult. The channeling of all national savings into industrialization and defense created a constant shortage of commodities. By 1935 the situation gradually began to improve. Not only nominal wages, but also the real standard of living began to rise in both city and village.

The general standard of living of the Soviet worker was unquestionably higher during recent years than it had been before the First World War, and promised further improvement. But even by the end of the Third Five Year Plan it was still lower than that of the workers of other industrial nations. In 1938, for instance, the diet of the French, and even of the Italian worker was superior to that of the Soviet worker. Compared with Swedish workers, the Russians had more bread, but less meat, fats, milk, sugar and vegetables.

Despite his generally low standard of living, the Soviet worker was conscious of definite improvement over his pre-Soviet existence. Soviet statistics reveal

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that the percentage of the working members of the family has risen considerably. The wages of the individual worker are not much higher than those of tsarist times, but the fact that every member of the family is working substantially increases the general income of the family. Moreover, in present-day Russia there are none of the old fixed distinctions among the various income strata of the population. Thus, it is a common occurrence that in the same family there may be laborers earning 200 rubles a month, skilled workers earning 800 rubles, and sometimes, also, engineers earning 3,000 a month. Even more important is the fact that for many years there has been no unemployment in the USSR, a fact which has engendered among the population a firm sense of security. If one adds that the Soviet system of medical care and education has freed the head of the family from the old worries, it becomes clear why, despite the slow growth of real wages, the people consider their lot substantially improved.

The economic level of the village has, on the whole, also risen. In tsarist times the living standard of the overwhelming majority of the peasants was extremely low. More than half of them never had enough bread. Only one-sixth of the peasantry had a more or less substantial surplus of bread for sale, the proceeds of which made possible the purchase of manufactured goods. In the collective village there are none of the old landless, horseless and homeless peasants. The standard of living of the former average peasantry has also improved. But the level of the former rich stratum of the village, *i. e.*, about 15 percent of the old peasantry, has noticeably declined.

The village is making its first steps in the improvement of its material and cultural existence. The standards of diet, of housing and clothing, the organization of education, of medicine, the supply of books and newspapers are considerably higher than they had been before the Revolution and are improving yearly.

In the USSR there is no enrichment through exploitation of hired labor, no private ownership of enterprises, no landowners waxing rich from rents. In this resides the tremendous social strength of the new order.

The war has been a test of the Soviet regime and, above all, of its social-economic system. Only the decisive changes in Russia's economic and social relations since 1917 can account for her defensive power.

Millions of workers and peasants are dying in defense of the Soviet Union because they know that they have something to defend, something to fight for. Both instinct and experience tell the Soviet working masses that in fighting Hitler they fight not only against Nazism, but also for their hopes, for the realization of their still unquenched desire for political freedom and social equality which had been awakened by the Revolution.

A. JUGOW

Administrators at Work

THE RED ARMY has exhibited surprising power in its resistance to the attack of the most formidable military machine history has ever seen. Many people have been most surprised, however, by its high morale and by the solidarity of the Soviet regime. Soviet industry and transport have functioned astonishingly well, while in the execution of the scorched-earth policy the Soviet Union has shown a determination unsurpassed in history. These facts point to genuine efficiency on the part of the Soviet administrative system and to the good morale of the Russian people.

It has been my privilege to attend several sessions of the Supreme Soviet, the highest government body in the Soviet Union. I remember particularly Molotov's speech several days after the signature of the Soviet-German Pact in August, 1939. The Foreign Commissar spoke for thirty-five minutes to the combined session of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, which roughly represents Moscow's Upper and Lower Houses. Molotov's speech repeated and enlarged on points already made in the press: the Soviet Union wished for peace; the governments of Daladier and Chamberlain had given repeated evidence of bad faith; it had always been better for both Germany and Russia when there had been peace between the two countries. The thousand-odd deputies applauded. A motion to dispense with discussion was unanimously passed. Another motion to ratify the pact and to approve the foreign policy of the government was likewise unanimously passed. The meeting adjourned.

Thus, without discussion and without question, a fundamental change in Moscow's foreign policy was accepted and approved by a body of peasants, workers, engineers and functionaries representing 170,000,000 Soviet citizens.

This was an excellent illustration of the Soviet administrative system at work. I remember a second picture, seen a day or so later at a large Moscow factory. Several thousand workers gathered together at the end of the working day, listened to a speech by the Communist Party secretary on the Soviet-German pact and unanimously passed a resolution of approval. In the same meeting, inner factory questions were the subject of violent debate. The assistant director was the target of vitriolic criticism, and the trade-union local of scornful abuse. The Soviet workers were exercising their right of free speech and criticizing their immediate administrative superiors in a fashion which

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would not have been possible anywhere else in the world. But on foreign policy there was no discussion.

The Soviet people had learned to accept the decisions of certain higher bodies on basic issues with total unanimity. What are these higher bodies?

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party is a body of thirteen; Stalin is the strongest personality, the most capable intellect and unquestionably the most powerful member. The most important People's Commissars—*i. e.*, government administrative officials—are members of the Politburo. The basic political decisions originate in the Politburo.[1] By basic decisions I mean questions of foreign policy, industrialization, collectivization, the organization of various branches of Soviet economy and national defense. Minutes of the meetings of the Politburo are never published. I think there is a good deal of discussion in these meetings, but I would be willing to wager that decisions are unanimous.

Having been passed by the Politburo, the decision is approved and executed by various lower bodies. It may come up for some discussion and a vote in the plenum of the Central Committee. This plenum probably is addressed by Stalin, or some other member of the Politburo, and the discussion confined principally to measures necessary to execute the decision.

The matter may then be turned over to some government body. The Commissar of Metallurgical Industry may be told that pig-iron production must be brought up to so and so. The Commissariat of Foreign Affairs may be advised to make certain representations to London or Tokyo. The Commissariat of Defense may be told to strengthen certain fortifications.

The matter then goes to the public. The newspapers publish the resolutions of the Central Committee of the party accompanied, perhaps, by a *prikaz*, an order of the Council of People's Commissars—the Soviet Cabinet. In factories, offices, mines and collective farms throughout the immense country these resolutions and orders are read, approved. Those involved proceed to execute them. In most cases the overwhelming proportion of the population approves actively or passively of the undertaking in question. Those who disapprove are seldom indiscreet enough to say so.

It is in this manner that basic decisions on questions of national policy in the Soviet Union are made and executed. How is it that the Communist Party and its Politburo and its ideological and administrative leader, Stalin, are able so effectively to exercise leadership?

The Communist Party is the only political party in the Soviet Union. Its members are strategically situated in every factory, office, government body, army unit in the country. Frequently they are heads of departments, factory managers, commanding officers of the army and navy. Every one of them is obliged by the rules of party discipline (based on the principle of democratic centralism) to carry out party decisions to the best of his ability. Failure to do so—the sabotaging of party decisions—is the most serious crime a party member can commit. Not only must the individual member execute party orders, but he must influence the factory, office or organization in which he works to do the same. The authority of party members is high among the population at large and a party-member factory manager usually has no difficulty in persuading his subordinates, the non-party masses in his organization, that a given decision must be executed.

The Soviet power has other organs at its disposal. The Communist Party exercises basic leadership; other administrative organizations function parallel to it. Osoaviakhim (Society for Defense Against Chemical and Aviation Attack), for example, is an organization of twelve million members whose function is the preparation of the civilian population of the Soviet Union for total war. For years this organization has been carrying out defense maneuvers: practising air-raid alarms, long-distance hikes in gas masks, and roundups of "enemy" parachute units throughout the country. It has made of each of its members a competent air-raid warden. It has prepared the civilian populations of border districts for total destruction of immovable property and evacuation. The work of this organization is aided by several divisions of NKVD internal troops whose function it is to nip in the bud any disorders or civilian insubordination in the country.

More than a score of People's Commissariats, subordinate to the Council of People's Commissars, administer industry, finance, transport, agriculture, defense and education. It is to the Commissar of Oil Industry, for example, that the manager of a Baku oil trust is directly responsible. The personnel of these commissariats is appointed by the Council of People's Commissars, or by the commissariat itself. No functionary in this administrative apparatus is elected. Each executive is held administratively, and often criminally, responsible for production in the industry or other organization under his command. He has considerable leeway within his unit to shuffle personnel, try to find additional sources of raw materials and, in other ways, exercise his own initiative in the fulfilment of the plan. Commissariat officials, as well as government and party functionaries, receive the best in living conditions. Their wages are high (the director of a plant where I once worked earned four thousand rubles a month, while the average skilled worker earned less than four hundred), rest homes, good apartments and limousines are at their disposal.

The question naturally arises in the minds of many American liberals: Is it expedient to leave basic deci-

[1] Since Stalin became president of the Council of People's Commissars earlier this year, the process has become simpler, the Politburo ceasing to be as important as before, and the Council of People's Commissars becoming correspondingly more important.

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sions in the hands of so small a group? In this connection I would like to mention one decision whose import becomes obvious to us only now—that taken in the late twenties to create a new heavy-industry and machine-building base in the Urals and Siberia to supplement that in the Ukraine. The execution of this decision meant that for several years everyone in the Soviet Union buckled down to very hard work under extremely difficult conditions.

Stalin was principally responsible for this basic decision and its execution. I am convinced that many of those high, top-flight functionaries who disappeared between 1936 and 1938 got into trouble originally because of their failure to agree with Stalin's far-reaching and ruthless plans for industrialization. Had those who disagreed triumphed, Russia at this moment would have virtually no metallurgical and machine-building industries. Because Stalin had the perspicacity to foresee the possibilities of a foreign invasion of the Ukraine and the power to force the execution of his decision to create a new industrial base, Russia today is still equipped with a powerful metallurgical and machine-building center which can supply Red Armies for a long time to come. As an example, a list of the score of known Soviet airplane and airplane-equipment factories shows that so far only four important centers of Soviet aviation industry have fallen into German hands (though several others—Leningrad and Moscow and their environs—are seriously threatened). A good half of these factories are situated in places like Perm, Tomsk, Kazan, which lie far behind the lines.

One of the most important accomplishments of the Soviet administrative system has been the elimination of enemy fifth-columnists. For the first time in this war Hitler's hordes are forced to fight tooth and nail for everything they get. In some European nations a host of Hitler's agents had undermined resistance; in others governments were turned over to Hitler without a shot being fired. In Russia we have seen no evidence of the existence of any effective Nazi organizations or agents. These were eliminated by systematic vigilance on the part of the Soviet people, the Communist Party and the NKVD. From 1936 to 1938 thousands of individuals who were accused of hostility to the Soviet Union were purged. Many innocent men and women suffered unjustly, but Quislings and Antonescus were liquidated.

One can agree or disagree with the desirability of an administrative system operating along the lines described above. It is clear, however, that the Soviet Union is offering the most effective resistance to German attack of any nation yet involved in the war. It is likewise clear that the effectiveness of Stalin's administrative machine, regardless of its failings, has been an important factor in making possible Russia's heroic defense.

JOHN SCOTT

Writing Since the Revolution

LITERATURE has always been taken seriously in Russia. The great and the near-great nineteenth-century authors fancied themselves as teachers and seers. In radical circles the utilitarian and doctrinaire view of art prevailed. Chernyshevsky gave currency to the notion that imaginative writing could justify itself only by being a "textbook of life." Since the revolution, literature has been regarded as a means of apprehending and shaping reality, differing from science only in its method, the author being considered a co-worker in the task of changing the world, an "engineer of human souls," to quote Stalin's dictum. And so the Communist Party seized control of this as of other social instrumentalities.

It is common knowledge that control is exercised not only negatively through a rigorous preliminary censorship, but positively by promulgating a literary policy which is carried out by the party-dominated editorial personnel and the Union of Soviet Authors. That body has declared its aim to be "the creation of works of high artistic significance, saturated with the heroic struggle of the international proletariat, with exultation over the victory of socialism, and reflecting the great wisdom and heroism of the Communist Party." A leading Moscow monthly states with satisfaction that "The Party and its Central Committee, personally Comrade Stalin, are guiding the process of literary development in the Soviet Union." The literary policy of the party has varied through the years, but has never gone back on the principle that literature must be made to serve the cause. In practice this meant that it was made subservient not to a large purpose but to the particular program that the party espoused at the moment. The writing that officialdom requires is that which is of immediate practical, rather than lasting, value.

The apparatus of control includes criticism. The critic takes his responsibility seriously. He passes on both literary values, about which he is none too discriminating, and on ideological correctness, about which he is very strict. There are unmistakably minatory overtones in his condemnation. Since literary achievement is regarded by the government as a civic deed, a writer's misstep verges on a civic offense. There is no room in the Soviet scheme of things for an author who presumes to call into question the "great wisdom" of the party, or one who shows any sign of dissent.

When the Union of Soviet Authors was launched in 1932 with official blessings, there was a general sense

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of relief in the republic of letters. It meant the abolition of the dictatorship of the proletarian authors, as well as the removal of the invidious distinction between authors who carried party cards and those who did not. An era of good will and liberalism seemed to be dawning. At its first Congress, which was held in 1934 with the pomp and circumstance of an international event, grandiose plans were formulated. The authors conjured up the vision of a literature adequate to the glorious epoch in which they were privileged to live, a literature which would help build socialism chiefly by fashioning an ideal image of the new man in the new society. And then came the purge, which threw everybody into a panic. A number of authors, both great and small, were dragged in the mud, gagged and cast into outer darkness. Some, like the once acclaimed Pilnyak, seem to have disappeared for good. Others have since been rehabilitated. On January 31, 1939, no less than 172 novelists, poets and playwrights received the Order of Lenin or other decorations "for distinguished successes and achievements in the development of Soviet literature." For days thereafter the Moscow Literary Gazette was filled with ecstatic expressions of appreciation and vows to be worthy of the high honor.

One of those decorated on this occasion was Alexey Tolstoy, who had previously been singled out for a similar reward. With the death of Gorky, now the sainted Ancestor, Tolstoy has become the dean of Soviet letters as well as in a sense the laureate of the regime. Significantly enough, the successor of the former hobo is a quondam titled aristocrat, who had been writing competent novels long before the revolution and who has come to see it as fulfilling the manifest destiny of Russia as a great power. In his ambitious novel about Peter the Great, still to be completed, he haloes the dictatorship with the reflected glory of the past. At the height of the purges he published a book dealing with the start of the civil war, which was a work of fiction in more senses than one. Here he deliberately falsified the record, to the end of glorifying Stalin and presenting Trotsky as the father of treason, showing himself most adept at the then fashionable game of seeing who could kick hardest the men who were down. One of the outstanding events of the literary season that the German invasion has brought to a close was the appearance of the initial chapters of "Cloudy Morning," the last part of a trilogy that Tolstoy had commenced twenty years ago, when he was still an expatriate. The scene here is the Don region and the Ukraine aflame with civil war. The author's craftsmanship, his wide knowledge of Russian life and his gift for presenting mass action lift this novel above the common run, but it follows the familiar pattern of the virtuous Reds fighting for the future against the wicked Whites who cling to the dead past.

Simultaneously with the appearance of "Cloudy Morning" came the long awaited completion of another novel on the same subject: Mikhail Sholokhov's "Quiet Don." The first part, published in English under the title, "And Quiet Flows the Don," seemed to promise that he would end by bringing his hero, the Cossack, Gregor Melikhov, safely into the Soviet fold. Hence the critics hailed the intrinsic merits of the unfinished work with a good conscience, in anticipation of its happy ending. As a matter of fact, the author disappointed this expectation: at the conclusion of his bloody Odyssey Gregor stands at the door of his desolate cottage, a stripped and broken man, and there is only the touch of his little son's hand to give him the sense of kinship with the earth from which the revolution had torn him. "Quiet Don" is unquestionably the greatest book that has come out of Soviet Russia, and proves its author to be the country's foremost writer. This rich novel, which has the dimensions of a *roman fleuve*, gives the very body and pressure of life in peace and war as it is lived on the Don, that region apart, inhabited by a full-blooded Centaur race. It is one of the paradoxes of the situation that the most impressive novel produced under the Soviet regime thus far derives neither from the class that is said to have made the revolution and was raised to the pinnacle of glory by it, nor from the great body of the peasantry, but from a special privileged sector of it set apart by democratic origins and a later close association with the tyranny of the tsars.

No less loyal to the regime and its leader than Tolstoy, Sholokhov, perhaps because this native of a Cossack village has no bourgeois past to atone for, but is a child of the revolution—he was only twelve years old when it broke out—has nevertheless somehow managed to maintain his integrity as an artist. There are other writers who, while keeping well within the law, succeed in producing work that shows signs of the artist's conscience and his personal vision. Such is the idiosyncratic verse of the aloof Pasternak. Such are the thoughtful and moving fictions of Kaverin, and the work of that dry and conscious craftsman, Kozakov, who comes nearest to being a kill-joy among celebrants. (These three have not been decorated.) Then there are the psychological novels of Leonov and to some extent the plays he has written more recently. The roster would be incomplete without the names of Prishvin, Sergeyev-Tzensky, Fadyeyev, Fedin, Vsevolod Ivanov, Tikhonov, Ehrenburg and Zoschenko, that *rara avis*, a Soviet humorist. The name of Babel, whose short stories give the very essence of the stirring early years, should also be mentioned here, although he has not broken a long and suspicious silence, in spite of many urgings. Aside from one or two survivors of the prerevolutionary generation, they are all men now in their forties or early fifties who found their voices at the start of the Soviet era. Some of them come from that group of literary aspirants who, in the early years of the revolution, when men dreamed generous dreams

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of a free and just world, banded together under the name of The Serapion Brothers. They were fathered by Zamyatin, a scrupulous and original writer who, after a valiant attempt at adjustment, was permitted to expatriate himself, and died in exile. The Brotherhood openly championed a neutral and objective art, and held that literature had no aim and meaning, but like life was its own excuse for being. Its surviving members have since abjured the beliefs of their youth, but one wonders if their work does not owe its distinction to the fact that they grew up in a free air.

An alarming feature of the situation is the paucity of fresh talent. Young writers are offered every encouragement, bar intellectual independence, but too often disappoint expectation. One listens in vain for a new note. There is no sign of the heralded advance in method, the new form which was to fit the great theme of socialism. There is nothing novel about the lengthy narratives that are in vogue. The best of them, "Quiet Don," belongs to the good old tradition of nineteenth-century realism. The experimentation in form which marked the first years of the revolution and which vitalized Russian prosody, has, except in the field of poetry, practically ceased. Occasionally a critic will lash out at "formalistic trickery," but this is flogging a dead horse. The accepted literary method is that of "socialist realism," a shibboleth coined by Stalin and adopted as part of the credo of the Union of Soviet Workers.

It is in line with this insistence on realism and with the prevalent attitude toward literature that the author is expected to cope with subjects of current interest. But how deal honestly with such subjects under conditions similar to those in which Alice played croquet with the Red Queen? Naturally, when modern themes are handled, the most innocuous are in greatest favor. Last year a prominent author, after examining the crop of fiction of the preceding three years, declared that should a future historian wish to reconstruct the Soviet life of that period from its novels he would conclude that the chief business of the country was the conquest of the Arctic. The flood of novels about industrialism, started when literature was commandeered to lend a hand with the First Five Year Plan, is finally abating, to everyone's relief. More recently fictional tracts on the family and the home as the cornerstone of the state have been achieving popularity, and there is, of course, always the civil war to fall back upon, while of late years there has been a tendency for the author to escape into an even more remote past. The spy and the saboteur are the stock figures in the mass of writings which are the equivalent of our detective stories, the difference being that the reader has to take a small amount of entertainment with a big dose of propaganda. It should be noted that the West has been ignored in literature, being rather feared and disliked. One of the few authors who manages to maintain contact with Europe is the versatile and agile Ehrenburg, whose latest novel is "The Fall of Paris." The more sensitive and craftsmanlike Fedin sets the scene of his last two novels outside the Soviet Union, in order, of course, to paint the decay of the capitalist world (shades of Slavophilism!), though the moral is not too obviously pointed.

In a country where everything is done in the name of worker and peasant, surprisingly little is written about the common man, whether *kolkhoz* member or factory hand. Panferov's mammoth narrative about the peasantry, completed several years ago, stands almost alone. And even the most sanguine Soviet critic would admit that when it comes to producing the image of a socialist hero, the writers have not delivered the goods. There is an abundance of wares turned out by time-servers and "lacquerers," what one reader aptly called "hallelujah literature": made-to-order books radiating an official optimism, proclaiming that all is for the best in the best of all possible states.

The general level of drama is lower than that of fiction. In spite of the readiness of novelists and poets to turn to writing plays, the eagerness of producers, the talent of actors and directors, in all these years scarcely a piece of lasting value has been staged. Is it at least in part due to the fact that the dramatic censorship is even more umbrageous than the literary? Poetry does not play the important role that it did in the early years of the revolution, and a shameless amount of doggerel has been printed, much of it by way of tributes to Stalin. Proletarian poetry, in spite of the care lavished upon it, can scarcely be said to flourish. Of late years Pasternak has taken refuge in translation, from Hans Sachs, from Shakespeare, from Verlaine. Mayakovsky's prosodic innovations are now common property and he has an able disciple in Aseyev. Tvardovsky can agitate for agricultural collectivization in a delightfully naïve and lyrical balladry. The markedly original Selvinsky, a puckish spirit remotely related to Joyce and with a dash of eecummings in his make-up, seems to have sobered down. His latest production, "Cheluskiniana," is an epic seeking to "create an image of contemporary Soviet society" out of the material furnished by the heroic story of the voyage of the ice-breaker Cheluskin. At least one critic has put in a word for "the right to lyricism" or "the propaganda of the lyrical ego," but the long poem, attempting a synthesis of heterogeneous elements, remains the favorite form.

At their first Congress the Union of Soviet Writers, in a greeting to Voroshilov, pledged themselves to produce literature celebrating the modesty, the heroism, the moral beauty, the "high ideology" of the fighters of the Red Army, and that body's strength, "to which nothing can be compared." They also undertook to write about the potential enemies, and show up their "anti-human aims," not forgetting to portray the

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proletarian allies girding themselves for battle in the rear of "the capitalistic armies." The pact with Germany put a quietus on the second part of the program: no anti-fascist works were produced while it was in effect, although, be it said to the honor of Soviet authors, there is nothing in their writings that could be interpreted as a friendly gesture toward the Third Reich. On the other hand, a whole "defense literature" sprang up, designed to stiffen the morale of the army and stimulate a militant patriotism in the civil population. It is not impossible that some of these efforts, painfully crude as many of them were, had a share in preparing the resistance that the people are now offering. Of late years much work has been done by way of acquainting the Russians with the literatures of the other nationalities in the Union, to the end of knitting the peoples closer, that united they might face the conflict which has since become a reality.

If this tale points a moral, it is one of those platitudes that in these times need to be recalled: literature, if it is to be more than a propaganda technique, can only thrive where it is free; the writer, to be either an honest witness, as Chekhov would have him, or an incorruptible judge, must be at liberty to obey no dictates save those of his mind and heart.

AVRAHM YARMOLINSKY

Science and Research

THE SCIENTIFIC WORK most popularized in the Soviet press is that related to the burning problems of Soviet economy and politics. The most vital work of this sort is perhaps the exploration of a "Northern Passage" from Northeast Europe along the mouths of the great Asiatic waterways through the Arctic Sea to East Asia, Kamchatka and Vladivostok. It would not be surprising if the Arctic weather stations, military bases and new industries were to play an extremely important role in the present war. Likewise the acclimatization of new crops to Siberia will soon show its practical aspect if it becomes necessary to feed an army of millions while most of the old wheat-growing districts are in enemy hands.

Motorized divisions of the Red Army are rolling out to meet the enemy on tires made of native rubber. Russian botanists found two mountain plants, indigenous to Soviet territory, from which they believed rubber could be made. Chemists confirmed their theories by quantitative analysis. Rubber was made experimentally from kokhsagys, experimental crops were planted. Since then agronomists have learned to grow the plant on a large scale, and factories have been built to process it.

In some fields the results of Russian research work have been remarkable, in others mediocre. This was to have been expected, quite aside from the special cultural situation prevailing in the Soviet state. Best known are the Russian successes in exploring the Arctic, the journey of the four members of the Papanin expedition on an ice-floe drifting southwestward from the North Pole; the voyage of the ice-breaker Sedov, which emerged from the ice-pack only last year. The experiments of Lysenko and his group in yarowizing wheat made it possible to grow winter wheat in an inclement climate such as prevails around Moscow; and experiments in fruit grafting, particularly those of pomologists following in the footsteps of Michurin, brought fruit culture to regions where formerly, it is claimed, not a single apple could be grown. Russian chemists—particularly those specializing in naphtha products; physicists—especially in atomic theory and radiology; soil specialists, particularly Professor Williams and his school, have maintained the high prerevolutionary level; geneticists, eminently N. I. Vavilov; mathematicians—the Moscow school of young mathematicians; applied roentgenologists—for example, the work of Rochlin in Leningrad, with his application of X-ray to anthropology—have repeatedly directed the attention of the world to Soviet science. Much of this work—and more which I cannot list here—simply continues an existing tradition.

But the subjects of research are not the only distinguishing feature of Russian science. The whole attitude seems strange to an American. In no lecture by a Soviet scientist can you escape the phrase: "All this would not have been possible but for our training by the Communist Party and the personal interest of Comrade Stalin." There is never the slightest variation of this phrase. You will likewise hear it from the lips of outstanding sportsmen, a famous actress, from Papanin on his return from the polar night, from Lysenko, or O. J. Schmidt. This may seem to be pure ritual, as when an American says, "Pleased to meet you," though his reaction is quite the contrary. Yet that is not the case. The phrase expresses a reality. It means: there is only one boss in the USSR, and that is the state; there is only one party in the state, and the man who counts in state and party is Joseph Stalin. Political leaders have their fingers on every branch of science. Stalin himself inspired the preparation of the "History of the Soviet Union," and gave detailed instructions concerning the methods to be pursued. The working plans of the academy of sciences for each year must be approved by the People's Commissariat—and these plans embrace literally every single research topic of every scientist in the leading institutes. In 1938 Stalin made a speech to delegates from the universities, in

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which he laid down a line for Russian scientists to follow. Russian scientists, he said, must emulate Galileo, Darwin, Lenin, Stakhanov (initiator of the Stakhanovist system in the Donets coal mines), Papanin. Every newspaper and periodical in the country hastened to add the name of Stalin to this list. And on December 22, 1939, Stalin was made a member of the Academy of Sciences.

Indeed the largest state apparatus in the world places all its resources of money and power behind those scientific enterprises compatible with its political line. Every ruble spent in this way is well invested. And when a scientist has been successful in an undertaking, the state becomes the hero's manager. There is hardly a country in which men of science are given so much publicity, subjected to such a rain of titles and rewards. A leading scientist must be without all ambition if he does not end as a deputy in the Supreme Soviet. Even theoretically, science is inextricably bound up with the public life of the socialist state. This has its good aspects. It causes work to be done in certain theoretical fields neglected in foreign countries, such as evolution in all its ramifications. Another good feature is that the general public is protected from pseudo-scientific writings on subjects such as astrology, and I have not observed that anyone has suffered from the restriction.

In 1940, the Soviet Union numbered 750 universities, with 619,000 students; 694 research institutes, and 4 academies, the two last with numerous branches and sections, 18,000 professors and instructors, etc. The number of students and instructors has fallen as a result of new laws (1940) doing away with study free of charge, not to mention the effects of the war. The largest and most pompous agricultural exhibition in the world was put on in Moscow in 1939 and 1940. It strikingly showed the work of organization and propaganda which the state expects scientists to perform in connection with agricultural campaigns.

But to use a saying of Stalin's: every coin has its reverse side. In return for its support of science, the state makes certain demands on scientists: (1) All energy must be concentrated on practical results, capable of immediate application; in other words, science is subordinated to the Five Year Plan. (2) Young cadres, predominantly from working-class and peasant circles, must be used wherever possible: a party card can fill a number of gaps in scientific training. (3) Scientists must adhere to and follow the basic philosophical doctrine of the Communist Party: of dialectical and historical materialism; Darwinism in biology, Stalinism in sociology and economics.

A glance at the scientific journals of the Soviet Union suffices to show that the state uses the scientific press not only for the publication of scientific matter but also for political propaganda. This can take the form of editorials or articles reprinted from the daily press (usually accompanied by pictures of Stalin or Molotov), but supposedly scientific articles also serve the purpose. An article may inquire what branches of science or technology are most important for a certain sector of the Five Year Plan. There may be an article on young (read, as a rule, young Communist) scholars who have registered "epoch-making" successes in some scientific field; or on the advantages of Darwinism as a theoretical basis for some field of research. At the time of the Moscow trials the editorial board of Microbiology, a serious and much read periodical, addressed (Year 6, p. 1) a declaration to its readers which began as follows: "To all microbiologists in the USSR. The case against the Trotskyist center has called forth a storm of indignation among the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, etc." Americans may ask what such things have to do with microbiology. Proclamations and manifestoes of this sort are found in all journals of the Soviet Union on such occasions, and Microbiology is only one example. This sometimes gives the periodicals an unpleasant resemblance to those printed 1,000 miles to westward.

It must, however, be admitted that some of the organizers of Russian science are really interested in the objective progress of science. Though we know that true science bears the element of progress within itself and does not need any benevolent protection, we must recognize that the screaming propaganda for Darwinism, the belligerent tone of the anti-anti-Darwin literature arise from a conviction that the progressive theory needs help to triumph over reactionary theories. Unfortunately the form in which this is done contains much old Russian despotism and new Russian bureaucratism.

There are certainly many administrators who do not act from idealistic motives, but from ill concealed egotism and opportunism. A member of the Academy startled his colleagues by an article in Pravda, central organ of the party, proving that "Flora of the USSR" was conceived in accordance with the reactionary scientific system of Wettstein-Engler. The author of that article must know something about the history of botany; he must know that Wettstein's is the most progressive system of modern botany; we can only assume that Boris Alexandrovitch Keller was determined to discover "reactionary" tendencies at any cost, as such a discovery would cause him to be regarded as a "bold innovator."

What is the position of those scholars whose work does not produce economic benefits capable of immediate appraisal? And what of those whose theories are far removed from those recognized by the state, or who have neither the desire nor opportunity to become members of the Communist Party? It must be said that today the percentage of Communists among the Soviet intelligentsia is rather high and that the

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majority are obviously loyal; while the minority of old professors who are still opposed to the regime refrain from all open propaganda or illegal political activity. Moreover, there are no longer any scholars in Russia who would openly say: I do not recognize dialectical materialism as a method of research—though such cases did occur up to 1933. There are no longer any scholars who would get up at a meeting to review scientific projects for the year, and say: True, the work I am planning has no immediate importance for the state, but one can never know what field of research may provide the solution for present problems. I therefore wish to continue with my work. Actually, projects without practical importance are sifted out, and implicitly, practical names are sought for impractical projects. When necessary, a theoretical cloak is made to order. Hence it is no wonder that most specialized monographs are all cluttered up with "dialectics," "production," "Darwin," "Timiriasev" (one of the first Bolshevik scholars), "Michurin," and quotations from Lenin, Marx and Engels. The reader often has great difficulty in finding the connection.

Of course the average scientist does not enjoy all the advantages of the elite. He is not highly paid: the average annual salary of a professor at the Academy of Sciences would have a purchasing power of about $1,200, if it were not for deductions amounting to about 20 percent, and for the fact that in Russia many cheap articles are unavailable and must be replaced by more expensive ones. A scholar is entitled to sixty square feet of dwelling space—three times the normal amount—but in reality cannot always get "so much." Such crimes as tardiness, changing jobs without authorization of his director, refusal to travel in line of duty or to accept transfer, are punishable by imprisonment. Anyone who has worked in Russia is impressed by the complications attached to the simplest things. To get a book from the library often requires more time than to study it. Nearly a whole day is required to obtain all the stamps and signatures needed for a vacation. Traveling is even harder; one must wait in line weeks in advance, often in several lines. It is exceedingly difficult to carry on experiments, since the necessary materials can never be obtained when you want them, and the administration spends more of its time studying the stream of decrees and laws than on the smooth organization of research projects. It is not easy to obtain suitable assistants. The training of students, though it has recently improved, is still inadequate, as too much time is spent in practical political activity and the study of scientific Marxism.

Can scientific America learn anything from Russia, or could Russia adopt any of our principles of free research? I do not believe so. The character of scientific activity in both countries is inseparably bound up with the prevailing political structure. ROLF SINGER

The Legal Framework

SOVIET PARTICIPATION in the war has not introduced an entirely new era for Soviet law. The Soviet Union has always maintained a militant system of jurisprudence, in which the pressure of public need has been clearly apparent. The war has but emphasized a basic principle which underlies all Soviet legal thought.

Soviet codes of law are the creatures of the early twenties when revolution and civil war had emerged from the turbulent military stage to the routine of daily living. Major revolutionary principles formed the background against which the codes were drafted. Although having this background, the codes were prepared to introduce a constructive period following the period of destructive civil war and militant communism. They mirrored both the period which they followed and the draftsman's ideas of the period which they were intended to introduce. They were the product of a desire to establish certain basic rights on which a citizen could rely, and they also reflected a fear lest the individual misuse his rights to the detriment and perhaps ruin of the society toward which the Soviet leaders looked.

Rights were defined in codes of law, but at the same time precautionary provisions were inserted. An officer of the law under these provisions might nullify or even punish an effort to exert a right to the detriment of the basic political and social principles on which the state was thought to rest. No loophole was left for defense on the ground that the letter of the law did not forbid one or another type of activity. The precautionary provisions have remained in the codes to the present day. Article 1 of the Civil Codes of each republic retains the precautionary provision that civil rights are protected by law with the exception of those cases in which they are exercised contrary to their social-economic purpose. Article 16, or its equivalent, in the Criminal Codes of each republic provides that if one or another socially dangerous act is not specially provided for in the Code, the basis for and limitations on the responsibility for the act shall be defined by applying the article of the code which is most closely analogous to the offense committed.

Foreign observers have often seized upon the precautionary provisions of the codes as giving reason to believe that no law in the Anglo-American sense of the word exists in the Soviet Union. Such a judgment overlooks two facts: the provisions were instituted as

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precautionary measures rather than as governing principles, and cases indicate that they were constantly narrowed in their application by courts during the years preceding the present war. Judges in courts of first instance had reached the point where the precautionary provisions were never allowed to influence a result, and even appellate courts applied them only when necessary to avoid a result which they would have thought shocking in terms of their criterion of service to a state pledged to develop a new economy. Peacetime conditions were providing the scene for the development of a carefully prepared and reasonably stable system of law. At the same time the precautionary provisions remained in the code for the emergency.

To a considerable extent the Soviet Union has always been poised for an emergency. The extent of anticipation has varied as international or internal problems have varied in potential danger. There has always been an undercurrent of anxiety. The most pronounced period of stability and freedom from anxiety was reached with the publication of a draft for the new Constitution in June, 1936, but this stability began to fade even before the draft could be adopted. In the closing months of 1936 the USSR entered a new, actively militant stage and Soviet law, as the handmaiden of the state, kept pace with the development.

Most provisions of Soviet law are neither novel nor exciting. An American lawyer who acquaints himself with the basic forces motivating Soviet socialism can quickly make himself at home in Soviet jurisprudence. Civil rights in the ownership of consumers' goods and the contract relationships essential to everyday life follow familiar Continental patterns. Scarcity conditions introduce certain elements into the legal relationships between the tenant and the person who owns or operates a dwelling house, but these elements have often been found in non-Soviet systems of law during times of housing crises. It is equally a crime in the USA and the USSR to steal a pocketbook or kill your neighbor. One may not abandon one's child or fail to support a needy wife or parent. Such "every-day" principles of law are common to Soviet jurisprudence as well as to the law of other lands. They contribute their share to the preservation of an orderly society without which a government can expect little loyalty from its citizens. These are the principles of law which escape notice outside the Soviet Union because of their very commonplaceness.

Alongside the familiar concepts, there are the more publicized legal institutions which have been developed to meet peculiar problems of the Soviet system of economy. Most of these spring from the fact that the state owns the basic means of production and from the fact that normal economic checks are blunted under scarcity conditions. It is these economic provisions with which Americans are usually concerned, and they merit review in a survey of Soviet law.

Economic crimes are defined in Soviet criminal codes. Production of underquality goods in a state-owned factory, or misuse of state-owned property in some other manner, is a crime. Sale of underquality goods in a store or violation of the rules concerning trade are crimes. Under our system of economy, the factory which produces inferior goods or the store which ignores its customers theoretically loses its business and the economic means to continue. A negligent factory manager or store manager is dismissed or impoverished.

Under Soviet conditions of scarcity as they have existed over much of the past twenty years a factory may sell its goods and a store is assured of business even if its goods are inferior, and the customer's wishes and sensibilities are ignored. The major effective weapon available to the state is the criminal code, and its economic provisions are enforced. The basic principle is maintained that the state exists for the purpose of creating a better economic society in which the individual is served promptly and with standard goods, regardless of his capacity to buy or his position in the community. The public servant who forgets this principle is held to account under the law.

Punishment of Soviet criminals is another element which has attracted the attention of Americans. Soviet jurists of early years argued that crime was the product of penury, and a socialist system which introduced work for all and the possibility of abundance would provide the occasion for the gradual disappearance of crime. Those who persisted in crime were expected to be those in need of reëducation or medical care. With the passing of the years unemployment became a historical condition and many believed that a condition of abundance was being approached. In spite of these facts, crime continued, although in reduced measure.

Institutions for the reëducation of offenders no longer chose their inmates from all types of criminals, but limited themselves, with few exceptions, to first offenders in crimes of non-violence. Recidivists and violent criminals were no longer given the privilege of pleasant village atmosphere and entertaining work in specially organized colonies. Some of these hardened criminals were placed in prisons or in labor camps, while penologists explained that the repeater had indicated his inability to avail himself of the chance for rehabilitation and that there was no path open for society except self-protection. This approach was extensively adopted for the political offender, whether a sincere dissenter or the paid agent of outside forces. The fifth column was exterminated, almost before it could form. Soviet penologists passed from their experimental and more friendly approach to an approach more suited to preparation for war.

Juvenile delinquency has likewise been treated with increasing severity. The youthful offender of the early nineteen-twenties was usually a waif, deprived of his

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parents by war, revolution or famine. His plight was pitiable and a challenge to the state. The government adopted the position that a boy of this type should be restored to a useful position in the community and that crime was not his fault. Numerous vocational colonies were highly successful in this effort. But the juvenile delinquents of the thirties came from a different background. They had homes and parents, yet some of them in their late teens resisted their families and teachers and became dangerous roughnecks and vandals in their communities.

To cope with the wave of "hooliganism," for which no sufficient numbers of institutions existed, laws appeared calling for the establishment of new rehabilitative institutions and for severe punishment for the worst offenders. The laws on juvenile delinquents, which were enacted in 1935, permitted the application of full criminal penalties to youths over the age of twelve. They did not, however, permit the application of the death penalty for such youths, for Article 22 of the code remained in force, forbidding the application of the death penalty to youths below the age of eighteen. The laws did not mark the introduction of penalties for juveniles, for such had always been permitted in reduced form, but they marked a step in the direction of severity. They provided an example of the vigorous way in which Soviet leaders were prepared to cope with emergencies when time did not permit the use of the slower methods of rehabilitation in educational institutions. They were another straw in the wind, which was growing ever stronger as the war approached.

Increasing legal severity in the twilight days of peacetime did not elicit complete support from Soviet citizens, whether law-enforcement officers or men in the street. Judges were sentenced for failure to enforce the laws, especially those laws which increased the penalties for juvenile delinquents. Crime continued and worried the writers on criminal law. Civil disputes crowded the courts, especially when family relationships or rights to dwelling space were in issue. Citizens grumbled when friends or relatives were caught in the dragnet of precautionary measures taken to rid the state of those who were believed to be enemies. On the whole, however, it seemed to be commonly accepted that the little man would have a fair hearing on everyday problems and would be subjected to imprisonment or worse only if it was his misfortune to have been in a position in which suspicions of treason were strongly supported by circumstantial evidence. Such was the status of Soviet law in mid-1939.

The war has entered the picture. Even before the Soviet Union took part, the government cleared the decks. Law became actively militant. Discipline was rigidly enforced by the regular courts. With the opening of hostilities in June of this year, the jurisdiction of military tribunals, for which definite provisions and limitations exist under the law, was extended to cover all activity in zones of conflict. Military jurists have now assumed the major burden of preserving order. The interests of the state have become clearly defined, and it is not difficult for the military jurist to apply Lenin's frequent warning that "Those who are not for us are against us!" Law, as the handmaiden of the state, becomes the mighty weapon it has been prepared to be. For the Soviet jurist, the task of administering a militant system of law will not be novel.

JOHN N. HAZARD

The Temper of the People

HITLER'S INITIAL STEPS in ruling occupied parts of Russia are enlightening. Out of the mass of White Guards who had girded themselves for the role of a Russian Quisling he has chosen for the position not a Romanov, or anyone with an exalted name or of exalted lineage in Old Russia, but an obscure man, a certain Zherebkov, an engineer by profession. In his first Nazi-inspired pronouncement, the Russian Führer told his followers that their help in the war against the Soviets or in ruling occupied regions would only add to Germany's difficulties. Soviet propaganda, he emphasized, would point to their presence as Hitler's intention to bring back "the gold seekers, the reactionaries, the landlords." Such tacit admission by Hitler's chosen Russian Führer of the power of Soviet propaganda carries its own commentary on the temper of the Russian people.

Most spectacular is Hitler's decision to uphold the collective farms. In the official publication, Das Reich, of August 17, there is an article on "The Future of the Collectives," in which the author points emphatically to their superiority as a method of large-scale mechanized farming. He suggests improvements—the enlargement of the individual holding and the elimination of the Soviet tendency to convert the peasant from an all-around farmer to a narrow specialist. From my long study of collectivization I am convinced that neither "improvement" would long be tolerated. Enlargement of the individual holding would heighten interest in individual tillage at the expense of the collective, and the large-scale mechanized farming which is the essence of collectivization demands, even more than manufacturing, numerous narrow specialists.

Nazi recognition of the superiority of collectivization as a method of farming is as unexpected as it is significant, for, barring our own professional Sovietophobes,

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no one had fulminated against the collectives with greater savagery than the Nazis. They had always denounced them as the ruin of Russian agriculture and the degradation and doom of the Russian peasantry. In October, 1939, during my stay in Stockholm, Nazi agents whose obvious task it was to gather information on conditions in Russia, especially on the morale of the peasantry, sought day after day to convince me that the moment war broke out, the peasants, because of their abhorrence of collectivization, would rise in a mighty revolt against the Soviets. Hitler's sudden reversal on the subject not only speaks of the man's utter cynicism, but is the highest possible tribute to collectivization.

Yet, as a few drops of milk do not perceptibly change the color of the reservoir of ink, so Hitler's manifest regard for certain features in the Russian Revolution does not significantly change the irreconcilable clash between Soviet and Nazi ways of life and the Soviet and Nazi tempers. One reason for the extraordinary fighting morale of the Russian people in this moment of crisis is the universal, almost intuitive, consciousness of this clash and of the utter impossibility of compromise.

This consciousness is compounded of convictions, sentiments and urges which transcend the ordinary definition of patriotism, with its love of land, of home, of people, or of government. It is inspired by a host of concepts which the Revolution has created and which are lacking in other peoples that have fought or been conquered by Hitler.

Consider, for example, the subject of private enterprise. Despite Nazi eloquence that they are seeking to bring socialism to the world, their actions in all occupied lands, and especially in the Slav countries, demonstrate only too obviously that their all-embracing aim is to oust natives from ownership and to put Germans in their place. They seek the destruction not of capitalism but of capitalists who are not Germans, so that only Germans may become the capitalists of Europe. But in Russia the destruction of private enterprise has been the mainspring of the Revolution. Anyone who has lived through the campaigns of this destruction will forever remember the passion, the cruelty, the decisiveness with which it was realized.

During the years of military communism at the beginning of the Revolution men were shot for selling privately a peck of potatoes or a sack of grain. During the First Five Year Plan, which witnessed the annihilation of the NEP and the final thoroughgoing onslaught on private enterprise in city and village, no person in Russia was deemed so gross a sinner, so vile a criminal, as the immediate or one-time owner of a business of his own, whether a large manufacturing plant or a struggling grocery shop. Deep into the consciousness of the people, especially of the youth (those thirty years of age or younger), has sunk the concept of the utter sinfulness of private enterprise.

Not that Russians wouldn't like to have good homes, good food, all the luxuries they could command. Most certainly they would. But they have been inoculated with the notion that only through collective ownership can and should such rewards be achieved. In all my wanderings in Russia I have never known a medical student who wanted to engage in private practice or an engineering student who hoped to own a factory. Former business men who survived the liquidation of private enterprise would pale or grow angry at the mention of a possible return to the old pursuits. Never again would they want to endure the degradation and the horrors of another "liquidation."

Even priests in the Orthodox Church have wholly absorbed the doctrine of the sinfulness of private enterprise and preach it continually. As for the Baptists and the Evangelicans, the two leading Protestant sects, they have always been champions of coöperative economic effort, though under their own, instead of Soviet, control. The impassioned propaganda has been reinforced by everyday actuality. Not a factory, not an enterprise anywhere, but has been built by the Soviets and operated by them. Too vivid ever to be forgotten are the memories of the sacrifices that the people have made for every lathe, engine and brick that has gone into these factories. Butter, meat, cheese, eggs, white bread that they should have eaten, textiles and leather that should have supplied them and their children with shoes and clothes, were shipped abroad and sold at low prices so as to obtain the *valuta* with which to pay for the importation of foreign machinery and foreign services.

To the workers especially, the factories are the very basis of their existence and of every hope and every ambition they have ever cherished. The vast majority of them have never known what it is to work for a capitalist, especially a foreigner, whether an individual, a corporation or a government. They can conceive of no greater calamity than to be under obligation to do so. Therefore they can only stand up and fight and die rather than allow foreigners, especially German fascists, "the most brutal of all capitalist exploiters," to take over the Soviet enterprises and run them for their own individual enrichment. In fact anyone who would seek to restore private enterprise in Russia, whether along Nazi or other capitalist lines, must stir a struggle far more sanguinary than was the Soviet civil war and the accompanying campaigns of liquidation, and with far greater loss of life. To appraise the Russian Revolution now in any other terms is to miss the temper of the Russian people even more completely than did the Allied diplomats and generals who, in the early years of the Soviet, sent expeditionary forces to Russia in the hope that the Russian masses would rally round them and smash the new regime.

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Whatever the shortcomings or the horrors of the Revolution since the day of its birth, it has been conditioning all races and all racial nationalities in Russia to national and social equality. Therefore Hitler's racialism and the inferior status it imposes on non-Germans, especially on Slavs and Jews, is as violent a source of conflict between Soviet and Nazi temper as Nazi capitalism.

The Russians have no reason to expect greater consideration than Hitler has accorded the Czechs, the Poles, the Serbs. They are only too well aware that he will treat them with infinitely greater savagery, not only because of the clash in ideology, but because they have fought him more effectively, have upset his schedule of conquest, have tarnished irreparably his claim to invincibility. They know precisely what he means when in recent speeches explaining the difficulties on the eastern front, he had only one word for them, namely, "beasts." They have no doubt that if he ever gets into a position to wreak his vengeance upon them, the spectacle of cruelty will be one to shock the world.

They also know that the present clash between Slav and Teuton is the mightiest the two races have ever fought. Once and for all, Hitler is determined to rid himself of the "Slav menace" and to establish supremacy in Slav lands. Since Russia is the largest Slav country, she must bear the brunt of the battle. The fact that compared to Germans, Slavs and especially Russians are more fecund, only adds to Hitler's rage against them and to his determination to subjugate and annihilate them.

Hitler's racial theories, his contempt for Slavs, have direct economic effects which can only arouse the most stubborn resistance on the part of the Russians. What can happen on the collective farms? Hitler will need at least fifteen Germans, guards and managers, to operate each one. In European Russia alone he will need about two and a half million Germans to run the collectives. No doubt these Germans will follow the same procedure that they have pursued in other countries, especially those inhabited by Slavs. They will evict Russians from the best homes, the best schools, the club house, the park, or the best part of it. They will appropriate for themselves the best horses, the automobiles, if there are any, the best foods, the best clothes. Their children will enjoy superior advantages in everything.

In other words, the Germans will be masters and the Russians servants or serfs. The sense of social, racial and national equality with which the Revolution has inculcated the population will not permit a peaceful introduction of such a "new order" on the collective. Children will be as much the victims and the heroes of the battle as adults. By the millions they have been taught to shoot, so that they too could deal with an emergency like the one Hitler is sure to impose on them.

Not the least significant feature in the temper of the Russian people is their attitude toward Stalin, the man who had conditioned them to the doctrine of "socialism in one country," as opposed to Trotsky's "permanent revolution." At the outbreak of the war, professional Sovietophobes rushed to the microphone and prophesied a speedy end to the rule and even the life of the Soviet dictator. Yet after nearly five months of fighting, the bloodiest in history, Stalin is at this writing as supreme as ever. Obviously in this moment of a life-and-death struggle with Russia's ancient enemy, the people are governed not by the grievances of yesterday but by the security of today and tomorrow. The adulation of Stalin has dropped out of the vocabulary of the people and the press. The only ones that now command adulation are individual soldiers who gain distinction on the battlefield. The war must have impressed the Russian people with the fact that whatever Stalin's sins may have been, by driving them furiously and ruthlessly, at inordinate sacrifices, through plan after plan, he has given them the organization and the equipment to face the most highly mechanized army in the world and to inflict on it mammoth losses for every territorial gain it is making. Whatever the future may hold in store for Stalin, for the present his position is as secure as it has ever been.

There are many other features in Soviet society and daily life which, despite low living standards and the political dictatorship, have inspired the Russian people with a combativeness they had never known before. Had Russian generalship and equipment matched the quality of the fighting temper of the people, Hitler might still have been pounding at the gates of Minsk instead of Moscow.

But the fight must go on to the bitter end. Not even a separate peace could stop it, if only because Hitler is making no promises to any group of the population, save that he will rid Russia of Bolshevism and of "the Jews" who have dragged the country into the war against peace-loving Germany.

Neither he nor the outside world begins to appreciate what the Revolution, despite violent repressions, has done to Russian character and to Russian personality. It has made the "Soviet *Mensch*," as the German press speaks of Russians, utterly unfit for subjugation to Nazism or to any system that would bring back private enterprise to the Russian lands. If a separate peace is ever made at the expense of Russia, millions of Russian youths will swarm into the Urals, Siberia, Central Asia and start all over to build the society they want. They would penetrate the parts of China that are adjacent to Russia and build up vast armies and industries and fight on for years.

MAURICE HINDUS

This concludes the special section on Russia Today.—THE EDITORS

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What Science Does Not Know

IN THE PAST FEW YEARS science has achieved many marvelous inventions and discoveries, some of which I have described in this series of articles. But the story is by no means ended. Among the scores of leading research experts with whom I have talked in their laboratories, over and over again the comment was made that what we already know about the secrets of the physical world is as nothing compared with what we shall doubtless some day know.

In the course of these talks, and through supplementary letters, I have asked each of these men to give me a list of what he considers the most important unsolved problems of science today. There was a striking degree of unanimity in their replies on a number of matters. In this article, I shall describe briefly the scientific mysteries which received the heaviest vote.

The Mystery of the Ice Age.—Several times within the last million years, vast sheets of glacial ice have come down from the north polar regions and up from the southern ones, to cover great areas. As far as North America is concerned, scientists believe there were four or five such invasions, and that the ice went as far south as Virginia in the East and the line of the Ohio and Missouri Rivers in the Middle West.

Each of these invasions lasted for a very long period and destroyed or drove out almost every living thing, plant or animal. Between each two invasions, the climate in these areas probably became as mild as it is today; plants and animals came back. It is probable that even man existed in these regions during some of the more recent glacial epochs.

What caused these successive visitations? Is there any likelihood that the ice will come back again? These two questions together constitute one of the profound mysteries of science. Solely on the basis of probability, the scientists believe that another glacial epoch is altogether likely and that mankind and all his works may once more be forced to retreat from vast areas of the northern latitudes. We are certainly in an interglacial epoch and it has probably passed its maximum warmth.

Many hypotheses have been brought forth in the attempt to explain this amazing natural phenomenon. It has been suggested that the earth's axis might have shifted, so that the center of rotation was at a different place and the sun's rays struck at a different angle, which would profoundly affect the climate. But the physicists and astronomers say this would be practically impossible. Perhaps through volcanic or other action, high mountains reared themselves over vast areas of the north, producing excessive cold and changing the climate? But this would not explain the south polar glaciers. Did something happen to the sun—some unparalleled series of solar storms—to reduce the effectiveness of its rays upon the earth? Highly improbable. Did the entire solar system, rushing along at tremendous speed, pass through some extremely cold region of remote space? Science rejects this idea. Did the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere decrease, thus reducing the warming blanket of air which lies over the earth? It seems improbable. Did some extraordinary combination of wind and tide bring this result? Scientists do not think so.

The Mystery of the Cosmic Rays.—Every square inch of the earth's surface is bombarded day and night, many times each second, with rays that come from outer space. Their energy is enormous, billions of electron-volts, but we know of them only because of the effects they produce in breaking up atoms of matter on the earth, ripping up their outer electron structure and often wrecking their central cores.

Cosmic rays are in some characteristics like X-rays, but they differ in that many of them have a positive electric charge. Since the earth is a great rotating magnet, the positively charged cosmic rays are deflected as they enter our magnetic influence, tending to drift toward the poles of the earth magnet. For this or possibly other reasons, the rain of the cosmic rays varies from place to place.

The more we learn of the cosmic rays, the more important they appear. (The significant work on them has all been done in the last few years, though their existence was noted long before.) Since they smash atoms throughout every cubic inch of space everywhere and constantly, they act thus within our own bodies. What do they do there? It may be that they have enormously important effects, either for good or for evil. Each of the genes, which determine human heredity, appears to be only a single protein molecule. It is barely possible, though most biologists do not accept the idea, that the cosmic rays may destroy or rearrange the atomic structure of a gene and thus be responsible for the miracle of mutation. Even beyond this, it has been suggested that the cosmic rays represent a great part of all the energy of the entire universe.

Where do they come from? Science does not know. Dr. R. A. Millikan believes that they originate in the partial self-destruction of atoms out in the remote interstellar space. But no one can be sure.

The Mystery of the Common Cold.—One of the most familiar of human ailments is also one of the most puzzling: the common cold. Although this illness causes lost time in industry worth several hundred million dollars a year, and although it is sometimes

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the forerunner of other and dangerous diseases, science knows very little about it.

It is assumed that colds are caused by a filterable virus; but the evidence on this point is not yet entirely satisfactory. It is known that there is a vast variation in the susceptibility of individuals and that these differences can be hereditary. Vaccines have been prepared but the weight of the evidence is against them.

It is popularly supposed that the cold germ bites you if you have an "acid system" and that to ward off or cure a cold you should "alkalinize yourself." But this is nonsense. If in fact your system were to become slightly acid, you would almost instantly go into a coma and die. It is lucky that the various medicines taken to "alkalinize" oneself have little or no effect, since a very slight actual shift toward greater alkalinity would send you into convulsions with, again, a good chance of death. About all that science knows of a cold is that the bacteria or viruses, if that is what they are, are apparently air-borne, and that sterilizing the air with ultra-violet light or otherwise seems to reduce the danger of infection.

The Mystery of the Green Leaf. – One of the puzzling cryptograms which science is seeking to unfold is that of the wonderful manufacturing process which goes on busily in all the green parts of plant life, all day long. In its most important form, this process consists of sunlight creating chemical sugars out of carbon dioxide and water. This process takes place in the cells of the leaf or stalk, and the fact that these are nearly always green means that they receive and employ only light rays of a certain wave length, out of all those that are offered by the sun. The sugars are then changed into other substances, such as starch and wood.

We know that the process requires certain enzymes —digestive agents, or catalysts—that are found in the leaf and we know also that the green color of the plant is usually essential. This process of using sunlight to change carbon dioxide from the air and water from the soil into sugar is one of the two or three most important single facts about life on this planet: indeed, all existence, including our own, depends on it. At present, however, we use this chemical magic mostly at third hand. If we could learn to do what every plant in the garden does almost constantly from birth until death, to use sunlight to change carbon dioxide and water into sugar, the worst troubles of the human race would probably be over.

The Mystery of Life's Beginning. – It is impossible for the scientists to think of organic life—the life of plants, animals and man—as having always existed. They look back across the uncounted millions of years to the time when, among the inert chemicals of which all matter is composed, the first cell must have arisen, and must have developed its incredible power of multiplying by division, which is the fundamental fact of growth. How did that cell appear?

Like everything else in the universe, the cells are composed of molecules, and these molecules, of atoms. Each atom is itself an infinitely tiny "solar system" of excessively minute particles, most of them carrying a positive or negative electric charge. The fundamental stuff of the cell and of inert chemical matter is the same; but the cell is an autocatalyst—that is, it acts upon itself to produce more cells. From this simple natural phenomenon come all the tremendously complicated and variegated forms of life. How did it start? What concatenation of circumstance brought the first cell into being among the atoms of such substances as hydrogen and oxygen? Science does not know.

The Mystery of Adaptation. – One of the great mysteries of nature with which science is striving to grapple is the development of higher forms from a lower. This requires two things: mutation and successful adaptation.

Everyone is familiar in a general way with the doctrine of adaptation to environment. In a world that is savagely cruel to the individual, organisms that are well adapted to survive successfully in a given environment are more likely to grow to maturity and thus be able to transmit their characteristics to their offspring. For a simple example: if you turned loose a thousand rabbits, half of them black and half of them white, to live on the snow fields of the far north, the white ones would be far less visible against the snow. If the blackness and whiteness were true hereditary conditions, before many generations black rabbits would be very rare.

Once in a great many times, an unexpected change occurs in an individual organism which is thereafter hereditary and transmitted to its descendants. In nature's vast laboratory there is room for an unlimited amount of trial and error. Millions and millions of mutations take place; most of them are unsuccessful and disappear, but the successful ones become the hereditary pattern of a whole group, species or genes.

The theory seems clear and acceptable when it is applied to such a simple problem as black and white fur in snow rabbits; but it is difficult to imagine such a process as providing the mechanism for some of the enormously complicated machinery of nature. To take a simple example: science knows that the termites which sometimes eat away the wooden foundations of houses cannot themselves digest wood. It is digested for them by bacteria living in their stomachs. It is hard to visualize the history of an adaptation in which the new insect appears which lives exclusively on wood and the bacterium appears simultaneously to take up residence in its stomach and do the digestive work. There is a tremendous gap in our knowledge of how this amazing diversification of function has grown up. Science simply does not know.

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The Mystery of the Proliferating Cell. – One of the great unsolved problems of science is the reason why there sometimes occurs in the tissues of men, animals and plants, uncontrolled growth of cells, until the individual dies of cancer. So far as science knows, cancer cells are like any others except that there are too many of them and they are uncontrolled, in that they do not form themselves into any real structure, like an organ of the body. All growth, whether plant or animal, comes through cell division. Normally the cells stop when they have gone far enough; once in a while, as suggested, this automatic regulatory system breaks down. Certain cells either continue to divide or start dividing after having been quiescent. They go on doing so, like the brooms carrying water in Walt Disney's "Fantasia," because the magic word is lacking to bring them to a halt. Once in many, many times, apparently, the process does stop of its own accord.

Since the genes control life, it is only natural that the scientists should ask whether some lack or abnormality in the gene is not the reason for the sudden burst of growth energy. Most of the pronounced characteristics of the genes, however, are hereditary and the scientists believe that this is not true of the great majority of the types of malignant growth, although it may be possible to inherit a predisposition in this direction.

Present thought among research scientists is running in the direction of a possible failure of the machinery represented by the hormones and the enzymes. If so, it may be connected with the vitamins which play an important role in the proper functioning of the body chemicals. It is quite possible we may some day discover that dietary errors that man has committed have upset the delicate regulatory machinery of cell growth.

The Mystery of Nature's Zippers. – One of the great unsolved riddles of science has to do with a process which goes on incessantly both in the tissues of all living things and among inorganic chemicals. The process is called catalysis, and the substances which carry it on (and without which, at work in your body, you would die in a few seconds) are called catalysts.

A catalyst, in simplest definition, is a material which changes one or more substances into something else without itself being affected in the process. A familiar illustration used in chemical laboratories is the zipper which joins together two edges of a fabric without itself being changed thereby.

The action of a catalyst can itself be modified by other substances. Indeed, a very slight change in the catalyst may produce an enormous change in the product. How does this magic process take place? How does substance A turn substance B into substance C, and itself remain, so far as science knows, totally unaffected? Or again, how does substance A turn substance B plus substance E into substance F and continue aloof? Perhaps the atoms in the molecules of the catalyst can go out to change the atoms in the molecules of the substance that is affected, and then return safely home again, as an Indian warrior might leave his village, set fire to that of a neighboring tribe and get back to his own people. But when you have said this you have said very little more than: We do not know.

Hows and Whys. – I have discussed thus far those scientific mysteries which got a heavy vote among the scientists whom I consulted. Let me catalogue just a few of the other riddles, each of which received one or more votes:

What is the structure and extent of the universe? When did it begin and when will it end?

What is the final relationship between energy and matter?

What is electricity? Assuming it is a flow of electrons, just what is the mechanics of such a tremendously rapid movement?

We now know that electric power can be transmitted by radio. What, exactly, is the process?

Just how do emotional and physical states in the individual react upon one another? What is the exact mechanism by which deficiency of thyroid causes mental depression, or a baffled state of rage creates indigestion?

As far as we can judge, human beings are the only inhabitants of this planet who are conscious of having a moral code, sometimes break it, and then regret doing so. At what point in history did morality come into existence, and how?

Is there any relation between the electric waves in the brain and thinking?

How and why do certain rare minerals, in extremely minute quantities, play such a vital part in the functioning of organisms, including man?

What is the actual process, chemically and physiologically, of getting old?

It is quite possible of course that some of the foregoing questions may remain mysteries for hundreds of years to come; or some of them may have been solved while this article is being printed. Solutions in certain instances will be worth millions of dollars, while in others the scientist's only reward will come in the acclaim of his fellows and the knowledge of an important piece of work well done. In either case it remains true that man's conquest over nature through knowledge marches on ceaselessly; and that this "time-binding" quality is one of the great characteristics that justify optimism about our collective future.

BRUCE BLIVEN

This is one of a series of articles under the general title, "The Men Who Make the Future," based on interviews with leading research scientists. – THE EDITORS

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Washington Notes

Democracy at Home

A YOUNG MAN who fought with the Lincoln Battalion in Spain came to Washington recently with a story that is not unique. Yes, he had been a member of the Communist Party and admitted it. But the Soviet-Nazi pact had been too much for him and he had quit the party without mental reservation. He wanted to help beat Hitler and he was a mechanic with a specialty that equipped him to fill a place in defense industry that would otherwise remain unfilled, at least temporarily, because of a shortage of skilled labor. But no defense industry would hire him because he was on a blacklist presumably compiled by the FBI.

At the OPM he was referred to the Justice Department. At the Justice Department he was told that no review machinery to handle his kind of case had yet been set up. After weeks of futile search for a job, days of equally futile effort to make someone in the government understand his plight, he was a depressed, bitter young man. He felt that he was already a veteran of the fight that his country only now was preparing to take on. He felt that he was a good American whom America had, for no good and sufficient reason, disowned. His former friends in the party had long considered him a traitor. No jobs, no friends, no hope.

A newspaperman in a certain American city, not so young as the mechanic, but as honest and sincere, likewise had joined the Communist Party during the depression period when breadlines in his town convinced him that capitalism held no hope for America. He, too, was frank enough to admit his disillusionment when it came. One of the newspapers in his town needs his considerable and specialized talents but it will not hire him. He is not on an FBI blacklist, but he is on an unwritten newspaper blacklist that is just as binding in his own town and knowledge of his town is an indispensable part of his equipment.

Scores of government workers have been undergoing a kind of star-chamber inquisition at the hands of the FBI. Some of them seem to be suspect to J. Edgar Hoover's men for no better reason than that they read various progressive or left-wing periodicals. Other were once members of what the Dies Committee called, usually with good reason, Communist-front organizations. Many government workers belonged to these organizations before the Nazi-Soviet pact, not knowing that they were Communist-controlled. Not long ago, FBI methods in the examination of suspected Communists among government workers grew so raw that Secretary Ickes protested to Attorney General Biddle at a Cabinet meeting and was upheld by President Roosevelt.

For all its zeal in the examination of petty government workers, the FBI has overlooked most of the well paid and prominent fellow travelers. Indeed, some of them manage to rise rapidly in the government service without let or hindrance from Hoover's sleuths. There is good reason to believe that in certain bureaus they still manage to promote each other by mutual back-scratching while systematically diverting suspicion to the non-Communist liberals with whom they work.

Liberals, in fact, are finding it much harder to promote their organizations and reforms than are the Communists. Recently certain leaders of the movement for poll-tax reform received a request from high administration places to lay off for the duration of the emergency. The administration, they were told, could not afford to alienate Southern congressmen who made up the largest bloc supporting the President's foreign policy. This didn't hurt the Communists, who have never helped and frequently hindered the organizations best equipped to fight the poll tax.

In so far as the object of the current purge of individuals and liquidation of organizations is to get rid of the Communists, the government's effort has been notable principally for the injustices. John L. Lewis does these things better. He is now throwing the Communists off his sundry payrolls and he doesn't get the wrong people. All he has to do is think back a few weeks and remember the men who supported his isolationist obstructionism most enthusiastically. So far the organizing staff of Local 55 of the United Mine Workers has been hardest hit. Some of Lewis' old friends are keeping their jobs by agreeing with the chief to his face and calling him "a traitor to the workers" behind his back.

The Red hunt now going on in the government is much like all previous Red hunts in that the quarry is seldom Red. Its victims are for the most part little people with no defensive equipment of their own and few defenders. As usual, the hounds are particularly sensitive to the scent of aliens. The Hobbs bill, which would permit indefinite confinement of deportable aliens without trial, has been approved by the Judiciary Committee of the House and awaits action. The committee recently stripped it of desirable features which had been used as decoys for liberal backing. Now the bill justifies its description as a concentration-camp measure, but the Justice Department still supports it.

Nothing is done meanwhile about evidence that the FBI tapped Harry Bridges' wires in violation of the anti-wiretapping law, and apparently nothing will be done. Attorney General Biddle has taken the position that the law does not mean what it says, or at least what such a conservative as Judge Sears, examiner in the Bridges case, says it says. In his opinion, Sears flatly declared, the affidavits "show a violation of Section 606 of the Federal Communications Act."

There can be no doubt that acts of sabotage against national defense were committed by the Communist-controlled unions that allowed themselves to be towed in Lewis' foaming wake up to the time Hitler marched against Stalin. There is little doubt that they would do it again if Russia were forced to make a separate peace with Germany. The Roosevelt administration has no reason for giving the Communists quarter. It would be delinquent, in the present situation, if it welcomed their support.

But the few government officials who have killed the fatted calf for the wayward sons are probably doing the country less harm than the Justice Department and the FBI. They are only playing into the hands of the Hobbs-Starnes-Dies gang in the House and undermining the civil liberties and freedoms for which President Roosevelt says we are fighting. A statute of limitations should eventually operate in favor of the kid who fought in Spain. This is a problem that requires gentle handling by big men. Biddle was such a man and should be now.

Washington T. R. B.

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Hollywood Footnote

I HAVE BEEN DOING some articles about Hollywood, always with the feeling that the limitations of space and/or journalism leave half of everything unsaid, or the wrong thing emphasized. The left-over footnotes are already enough to start a Ph.D. thesis, but already time on such a project is drawing to a close. One note is the matter of the shape of Hollywood as it is modeled with the liberal, or uplift, brassière. In this picture all the underpaid or otherwise dissatisfied are good; all the overpaid are evil. The actual work of pictures and the hopes of people who wish to make them well are left out as being dull copy, or at least not an invitation to the emotions of wishfuls and chumps. The copy that results is salable, and so printed; and it gets little or no attention from the only people who need encouragement or reprimand.

When I was on the Coast I saw an article in The Nation. It had a Hollywood dateline, but it was written precisely for The Nation. It was a piece on extras; it gave out statistics long established; it gave the usual half of the picture any editorial writer can run up from the usual handouts. But did it do anything in Hollywood, dateline and all? And where is the other half that should match it, and make it a recognizable picture of the actual problem? And who cares, finally?

The Hollywood bureaucracy is an inhuman and absurd machine second only to that of the various bureaus in Washington, no doubt about that. But there is one problem the extras have in general. The problem is themselves. In general they constitute no class of agriculturally or industrially dispossessed; they are not victims of geographical disaster; they are not skilled workers preëmpted by the Machine. They have converged on the town in swarms, attracted by the smell of easy money—which some of them have enjoyed in former times and latterly fallen out of. (And strangely, it is this latter class of extra which seems the best and quietest worker.)

But the main trouble with them in common is a lack of ambition, of willingness, of worth in the thing they are doing. Despite what the Screen Actors' Guild and Central Casting have done to regularize, limit, raise the basic minimum, the thousands still on register cannot get enough work to keep them adequately paid. This is always pointed out and duly bled over, without of course any concrete aid to the extras whatsoever. It is not pointed out that their pay when they work is three to thirty times that of unskilled labor anywhere in the world, starting with a basic minimum of $10.50 a day. From their behavior on the set and from the reports of directors—many of whom are people of as good will as you or I at the very least—I get the idea that by and large they are not the type of people who feel any need to try to do what little is asked of them. They are complacent in bungling, often sullen, sometimes vicious. The idea seems to be that the world owes them a living, and furniture to scratch their matches on.

Their eternal soldiering, remember, never works out against the Oppressors. The willfulness or incompetence of extras mainly presses on the people who are trying to make the pictures, and working hard. They will deliberately louse up a scene toward the end of a day that started at seven or eight in the morning for a company of more than a hundred weary people, simply to push the production into overtime checks for themselves. They will be rehearsed one by one until the whole scene is foolproof, and then on the final take fall to muddling and muttering when they should be still, passing in lockstep when they should be a subway crowd, never alert to anything save a request made on them that could be called an imposition by the book, and charged for as such. As for their answer to the main union framework which has benefited them, they will cross any line or undercut any category, given the chance.

This is the more glaring in an industry where even the least of the technicians crowding the lot (many of whom are on a week-to-week basis and often unjustly out, or "between pictures") are quick, resourceful and sunny of humor to a point not found elsewhere. The Directors' Union has taken the problem up openly and probably will again, for while a director in his position and salary brackets may seem like a man on velvet, actually he is a fifteen-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week man, and all overage in time and expense on the thing he is trying to make is eventually rendered out of his hide. He may also be a Simon Legree or a brass-tongue idiot, but the extra mob makes no distinction either way. (I have seen a good man and a world name in pictures hobbling all afternoon on a broken foot to get them ranged up for a short action take, only to have them mill listlessly into one blow-up after another. I've seen a couple of them wait until the camera was rolling to refuse a turn of the head in a scene, purely for the chance of sticking up for more money a director who is known everywhere for his underdog sympathies and who booted them off his set and hired two $50 bit players instead.)

Of course there are good extras, eager, pleasant, shamefully at the mercy of the rent bill on one hand and no-work-today on the other. If they could be winnowed out by assistant directors, and saved for use, that would give their union a bargaining point. And it would give them more chance to raise themselves out of a rut any good man would get clear of even if it killed him. It would be nice if the Hollywood-dateline writer could make extras as well as readers live in this dream of calling by name for the good extras, or people who would at least try. But unfortunately there is the fact that these very extras' good friends would trip them on their faces at the first opportunity, and there is the fact that Central Casting will be happy to supply named extras—as $25 *actors*.

Extras are a problem not only to themselves but to the unions set up for their betterment. They are a city or a jungle, and the laws of the city rule their actions as a group, and as individuals, and regulate their struggle for work and pay and bread. Their lunging and fickle bulk can be, and is, employed to vitiate the Academy Awards (a subject for a footnote in itself, presently). But their status is simply not that of the legitimately destitute, and their never ending locust descent on the town where movies are made is never retarded by the reticence of both Left and Right on the subject of any such problem so real to the movie-makers. If we are interested in these, the actively good people of Hollywood, we should understand their position and the conditions they work under; if our interest in movies goes no farther than the bleeding heart at space rates, what the hell are we doing here anyway?

OTIS FERGUSON

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The Bandwagon

"Just the same," Walker says, "the government is having the least trouble with the poorest people, whose sacrifice is greatest. They seem to practise the philosophy that they belong to their country, while the rich absentee landlord with lawyers on his payroll is more inclined to show fight." – *FSA Assistant Administrator John G. Walker, quoted in a story on the sharecroppers and tenant farmers who have been made homeless by the government's taking over their land for military camps, printed in The Newark Evening News.*

Woman, 40 to 45, gen. housework; permanent; must be ambitious, $3 wk., room, board. Write Mrs. Adell Alexander, Hinton, Okla. – *Advertisement in The Daily Oklahoman.*

The New York Custom Cutters' Club, holding its twenty-third annual men's style show, reprimanded New York's Mayor LaGuardia because he didn't measure up to his place in the public eye by dressing with care. It also suggested that both Ambassador John G. Winant and Vice President Henry A. Wallace might pay a little more attention to their clothes, and chose Grover Whalen as a perfect example of a public official who really looked the part. The club style show featured a canary-colored summer dinner jacket, with a hand-painted henna cummerbund, tie and handkerchief to match. – *From Business Week.*

Eisenschiml is of the opinion that it is not necessary to know foreign languages in order to translate well, although lingualistic achievements are helpful, of course. – *From The Writers' Journal.*

Escape to Strife

To a worker who is "fed up with" the monotony of his work a strike is an interesting and even glamorous adventure. Like war itself, the strike is an escape. – *Page 406, Chapter XII of "Psychology and Life," by Floyd L. Ruch.*

Ah, Youth, Youth!

The latter part of the program was furnished by the Jefferson High School band which rended several numbers. – *From The Purdue (Ind.) Exponent.*

Can't-We-Be-Friends Department

The Duke [of Bedford], whose pacifism has brought criticism in Parliament, described Hitler as an "untested man of mixed attributes with whom it is neither sensible nor right to quarrel until he has been tested by the one test which to me is worth anything—that of wise, practical, genuine friendship." – *AP dispatch from London printed in The Chicago Tribune.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – THE EDITORS

Correspondence

Excess Profits

SIR: In your issue of October 6 you recognize that Mr. Morgenthau's proposal of limiting profits to six percent on invested capital is not a tax on increased profits resulting from economic changes due to our defense program, but will in many cases constitute a tax on profits which have been regularly earned prior to the initiation of the defense program.

However, you justify this tax on the ground of capacity to contribute and state that corporations which have been making profits in prior years in excess of six percent upon invested capital, are "profiteers and slick operators" who should be compelled to give up their unreasonable profits.

Does not your argument ignore a vital consideration?

The great majority of shares of American corporations are not held by the individuals who originally invested their money in the corporations, but have been transferred to other individuals. Those other individuals have purchased the stock on the basis of the corporate earnings at the time. Now to say to these stockholders that the earnings of these corporations are unreasonably high and must be reduced by taxes, results in a reduction in the value of the shares, with consequent loss to the individual investors. This loss, however, will not fall upon all taxpayers in proportion to their ability to pay, but will fall only upon those who have purchased the stock of companies whose earnings were high in proportion to their invested capital, and will not fall upon those who have purchased shares of stock in corporations where the earnings were not in excess of six percent upon the invested capital. Clearly this will create injustice and would result in imposing taxes not in proportion to true capacity to contribute, as should be the case, but in an arbitrary and unfair manner. Smith, who had invested $10,000 in 1935 in shares of Company A, would find the values of the shares suddenly reduced to $5,000, whereas Jones, who had invested the same amount in shares of Company B, finds the value of his shares unaffected.

If you believe this argument is unsound, will you not point out its error?

New York City EUSTACE SELIGMAN

SIR: Your article "Mr. Morgenthau's Bombshell" in the October 6 issue overlooked, I believe, one rather important point—that the six-per-cent-profit limitation, by discouraging small business, would prove about as effective a scheme for slowing down the defense program as could have been devised. American industry, unfortunately, does not consist of several large plants located in Detroit; it has branches, subsidiaries, subcontractors, sources of supply, etc., in a number of other cities. That these are important should be fairly evident by now; we have been treated to enough not entirely irrelevant noise on the subject of "bottlenecks."

The point is that small business must continue not only to function efficiently, but to expand. This it will not do if its profits are limited in accordance with Mr. Morgenthau's or similar proposals. You may point fingers and cry "shame" until the Germans are over Brooklyn—it will do no good. Capital is not interested in ideologies, but cash. And be it good or be it evil the capitalistic system is the horse on which you are mounted in trying to cross this stream.

The curious part of the whole matter is that the government is already taxing back the great bulk of excess profits and is preparing stiffer taxes for the coming years. The nasty old business man of the cartoons, fattening on blood and tears wrung from his many enterprises—this person has been, is, and will be, pretty well starved. But it is the smaller opportunists, according to your article, that Mr. Morgenthau is after. Probably

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he will get them. It seems likely. It will be one more great step toward giving all possible aid to Britain. All aid short of help.
Newtonville, Mass. W. G. VAN KEUREN

[Mr. Seligman's argument might have a good deal of academic value if it were advanced in an economics course. Examined in the light of the present emergency, it has much less. In the first place, it does not concern itself with ability to pay taxes, but only with relative profits based on the fluctuations of stock values. The Treasury's idea is simply to go where the profits are, and with that policy we agree. What Mr. Seligman's argument amounts to is that Smith should not be taxed on excessive profits because his take, thanks to picking the wrong horse at the wrong time, is not nearly so staggering as Jones'. But is it right to criticize a tax principle that refuses to go behind the ups and downs of the stock market? Such an examination might not always be helpful to the reputation of corporate finance, which is much more careless with the holdings of poor Smith than the Treasury wants to be. Would Mr. Seligman like to be furnished with a list longer than his arm showing where banker-corporation teams have practically wiped out the poor Smiths in "reorganization" proceedings?

Mr. Van Keuren's letter has the virtue of frankness. It virtually confesses that many business men have put profits before defense, which is what The New Republic has been saying and proving for a long time. If, as Mr. Van Keuren suggests, the trouble is with the capitalistic horse we are riding, it might be a good idea to try a little corrective breeding, yes, even right in midstream. Mr. Van Keuren evidently does not read the financial papers so closely as he does The New Republic. Current statements show that the corporate fat man of the cartoons, far from being starved, is growing fatter than ever. As for the small business man, his enemy so far certainly has not been the excess-profits tax.

What both correspondents ignore, and what is at the heart of the matter, is the fact of the emergency itself. Both fail to look beyond business-as-usual. Sacrifice is a word that's being thrown around too freely these days, so let's put it this way—what a smashing answer the crew of the Kearny, say, could give to our business friends. —THE EDITORS]

The State Department Again

SIR: In Washington I have been told by several people who should know that the worst weakness of the State Department was in its Visa Division, handling entry applications from anti-Nazi refugees. In New York I have just heard of such a case.

In May, 1940, a woman of education and charm, formerly employed by a famous firm of scientific publishers in Vienna, reached New York after a difficult winter in London. She had left Vienna with extreme reluctance, because it was the only way to continue earning a living and so help her mother to escape; but the mother, a Czech citizen, had passport difficulties and was not allowed to leave at the same time. She was, of course, to follow.

Then, when her papers were ready except for the final American visa, and money for her passage paid, American consulates in the Reich were closed. She had expected to leave by way of Switzerland, but Swiss authorities refuse a temporary visa unless there is documentary evidence that the applicant will be admitted to this country. Our State Department declines to discuss issuance of entry permits unless application is made through consulates in neutral countries. The Department can hardly be unaware of the Swiss ruling, but it answers appeals with bland form letters suggesting the impossible.

The daughter is working madly to make ends meet and save money for her mother; she lost no time in taking out her own first papers. Her appeals to the State Department have been supported by all the necessary affidavits and by testimonies to her own character and capability, written by university and Christian church authorities. Her mother, she points out, is now eighty-six years old, and the Jewish home for the aged in which she was left may be requisitioned for use as a war hospital.

Refugee organizations, I understand, are hoping by pleading and petition to persuade the State Department to examine applications from German-occupied territory, and issue a statement to applicants which would in effect promise a visa if all conditions could be met. It is hoped that such a statement, though not a visa, might obtain exit permits from the Reich; and all persons interested in improving the present situation are asked to write to the President and to Secretary Hull.

Meanwhile, time passes and the State Department plays pussy-wants-a-corner. To be consistent with present procedure, hadn't we better black out that inscription Emma Lazarus wrote for the Statue of Liberty?
New York City WILLSON WHITMAN

Humor in The New Republic

SIR: There is one thing for which I wish to commend The New Republic, aside from its intelligent reporting and interpreting of national and world affairs, and its excellent reviews and discussions of the arts and sciences: I heartily commend The New Republic's sense of humor. It has given the right degree of seriousness to its discussion of the grim tragedy the world is passing through, and at the same time has been able to use humor to point out certain situations.

The editorial item, Last Week, is a case in point in the October 20 issue. The Bandwagon is another and Otis Ferguson is another regular feature. (Perhaps he would object to being called a feature.) However, humor in The New Republic is not found in certain features alone. It lurks even where it irks.
Arlington, O. CHARLES F. MILLER

From The New Republic Mail Bag

B. S. Porter of Wilmington, Delaware, asks: "What is this religious freedom which certain religious elements in the United States insist that the Soviet government must guarantee before they will support an aid-to-Russia program?" Do they mean merely freedom for all sects to worship as they please; or do they mean that the government must grant to certain religious groups the right to control education, the press, the cinema and the radio? Mr. Porter wants to know. If the latter is meant, "we can hardly blame the Soviet government for refusing to allow religious pressure groups to interfere in matters which are not their concern. Even in the United States a great many of us would not consider that religious freedom."

Berell B. Troyce, Cambridge, Massachusetts, writes us protesting against the rigid selective-service policy of drafting college and graduate students who are engaged in studies not directly concerned with defense. These men should play a large part in post-war reconstruction and should be allowed to complete their training before being inducted. Otherwise, he warns, "after leaving the armed forces, they will remain an unskilled, untrained drug on the social market." He urges that local draft boards be given the necessary discretionary power to defer these men.

We have been asked by a well known authority on Far Eastern affairs to call our readers' attention to a fortnightly publication, The Far Eastern Bulletin, edited and printed in Hong Kong by Dr. Chen Han-seng, former research associate with the Institute of Pacific Relations. He publishes facts about China and Japan which are not to be found elsewhere and at present, we are informed, he is having a hard time running The Bulletin without the subsidy on which most similar publications depend.

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Books in Review

Harold into Juan

IF BOOKS ON BYRON continue to multiply out of proportion to his poetic rank or to the popular attention granted almost any other English poet, the cause is not elusive. It is easier to exploit or dramatize a personality than to know or estimate a poet. For one reader who has a reasonable idea of Byron's talent, a hundred are exhaustively intimate with his reputation, scandals, heroism and follies. For every student who has even an approximate sense of his work, a thousand accept it as the projection of a temperament still almost unrivaled for its genius in self-exposure—a slave of its own violence yet as persistently fascinating to posterity as it was in infatuating its contemporaries in the role of hero, revolutionary, renegade, exile, "pilgrim of eternity." No other romantic poet had an equal fortune in finding the masks and epitaphs to fix him in the universal imagination. Byron's own personae—Harold, Manfred, Giaour, Faliero, Corsair, Cain, Beppo, Juan—were avidly accepted as soon as he presented them to the world—applauded variations of that "subject on which all men are supposed to be fluent and none agreeable: Self." He was the pilgrim of Shelley's apotheosis three years before his death; he won Goethe's accolade for possessing "a high degree of that daemonic instinct and attraction which influences others independently of reason, effort or affection, which sometimes succeeds in guiding where the understanding fails"; and when Arnold accorded him the cachet of an age-obsessing enigma ("He taught us little: but our soul Had *felt* him like the thunder's roll") in whom capitalized Passion contended with Eternal Law in a struggle that could be nothing less than Titanic, he elevated him to a symbolic fame that was not to be contested—and then by no means successfully—until the appearance of Rimbaud and Lawrence.

The enormous swelling of his legend (the accretions of the past twenty years alone are immense) is bound to stand in inverse relation to a comprehension of what Byron was, did and wrote. The propaganda fostered in recent years by men like Nicholson, Bellamy, Maurois, Gordon and Drinkwater ("vulgarization" is not exactly the word for even the worst of it) has had few corrections from critical quarters. The best of them appeared in Charles du Bos's "Byron et le Besoin de la Fatalité" in 1929, the pithiest in Eliot's essay of 1937. Eliot defined the critical problems when he said that while "the bulk of Byron's poetry is distressing in proportion to its quality . . . bulk is inevitable in a poet of Byron's type; . . . if Byron had distilled his verse, there would have been nothing whatever left"; that "if a writer has not the language in which to express feelings they might as well not exist"; that "to a man so occupied with himself and with the figure he was cutting nothing outside could be altogether real"; and that Byron's personality is poetically impressive only when he is dealing with a self that "is largely his own invention; it is only the self that he invented that he understood perfectly." "Don Juan" thus becomes Byron's masterpiece, especially in its last four English cantos, because here his false self becomes real by being projected into a real world, finding its poetic salvation in the humor, frankness, disreputability, honesty and satire that were needed to save the age from its delusions and the poet from his charlatanism. It is to Mr. Quennell's credit that in continuing his chronicle of Byron's career[1] (his account of the "Years of Fame" appeared in 1934) he has developed these critical arguments along with his skill in narrative; that he has shown how the fabulous romantic of "Childe Harold" became sublimated and redeemed by scandal, frustration, exile and the revulsions of profligacy during the Italian years, and so matured almost imperceptibly into the moral historian, satirist and realist who was able to come to some kind of terms not only with his century but with himself.

The present narrative begins where the third canto of "Childe Harold" begins—aboard the ship that took Byron, a social outcast, away from England to his seven years in Italy; it leaves him in Genoa, ready for the last act that took him to Greece and his death. The familiar ground between these points (1816-23) is skillfully covered. His relations with Shelley and Trelawny, Claire Clairmont and Lady Blessington, Marianna Segati, La Fornarina and La Guiccioli, and the imbecile riot of his Venetian palace, are deftly resumed. The spell of local and historical moments, always a fundamental influence on Byron's poetic and moral phases, is particularly well evoked. Mr. Quennell is not always able to lift these events above the banal level of his predecessors; for pages on end he lets us forget that Byron was writing the poetry which alone provides the title of interest to his adventures, even when it is a poetry deservedly submerged in the melodrama that surrounded it. To think for a moment of the integration of life and writing that Edmund Wilson might make of this material is to take the measure of Mr. Quennell's limitations. But he is good in curbing psychological speculation by means of documents; he does not confect dialogue or episodes in the abominable manner of Maurois; and he sustains his drama of the real against the self-invented Byron. He is at his best when he contrasts the baffled devotion of Augusta Leigh with the baffled vindictiveness of Lady Byron; when he compares the safety of Byron's cynical violence in love with Shelley's imperceptive and blighting sincerity; when he shows the extremes of paranoiac delusion to which Byron's distrust, loneliness and emotional demoralization could drive him (Shelley appears to have suffered an even more extreme disability of this kind); and when he estimates the rank of "Don Juan" by remarking that "the greatest works of literature are independent of the conditions among which they were conceived" and by showing that "Don Juan" isn't.

His most serious effort comes, however, in his last chapter; it was called "The Romantic Catastrophe" when it appeared separately in Horizon. Here he attempts to show

[1] Byron in Italy, by Peter Quennell. New York: The Viking Press. 274 pages. $3.50.

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how the "force of intellect" needed to save romanticism from confusion, decadence and anarchy failed it, even in Coleridge and Keats; how the collapse of revolutionary faith and the triumph of Tory reaction spelled the negation of the personal vision on which the romantic genius counted for its redemption. To this tragedy Mr. Quennell takes Byron as the clue. He presents "the brilliant amateur" who pushed to their fatal limits both the subjective idealism and the suicidal egotism which the profession of literature had curbed or inhibited in Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats and Shelley; as the demonic exhibitionist who aroused the world to a cause that needed guidance by reason, order and love if it was not to perish. A fatal degeneration of spirit afflicted both the men who honored those disciplines and Byron, who degenerated because energy exceeded mind and principle.

It is a sign of serious merit in Mr. Quennell's book that this argument does not come as an afterthought, yet his preference for the picturesque, dramatic and Byronic prevents him from making this interpretation of the problem of Romanticism more soundly basic to his whole study. Byron's poetry stands today at the nadir of its popularity and influence; his case and conflict are still alive and relevant; his type is peculiarly similar to the poetic nature of the present time, however sophistication or casuistry may disguise it. He is not numbered among the notable influences on modern poetry, yet he originated in its modern form the fusion of wit, passion, violence, sophistry, fluent intelligence and egocentric satire that has become a medium for verse criticism, journalism and topical pathos today. If Byron himself is not always with us—though actually he *is*—his formulation of the problem of literary personality continues to be. If Mr. Quennell adds a final volume on the last year in Greece it is to be hoped that he will round out the best modern narrative of the poet's career by exploring more fully the question which Byron exemplifies among poets in a way that should not be lost among the rival claims of his legend, his pretensions, and his worn attraction as one of the first flagrant dramatizations of the vexed modern sensibility.

MORTON DAUWEN ZABEL

Writing in Wartime

LET US PICTURE a professional writer who by working hard has usually managed to earn a comfortable income. Let us imagine that he has a few debts, no money in the bank and a fairly wide reputation. What are his prospects during the defense emergency?

They are considerably darker than those of a doctor, a business man or an engineer. In the recent past, writers have depended on half a dozen sources of income; by moving from one to another like Bedouins, they have subsisted even during the years of drought. But most of these sources have lately been shrinking like springs in a dry summer. Our typical writer—Emerson Jones, let us call him—is wondering whether they will continue to keep him alive.

The magazines, for example, are not buying half so many stories or articles as they did in 1920, for the simple reason that there are not half so many serious magazines. Most of those which survived the depression are now moderately prosperous; but more and more of them have ceased to depend on free-lance writers and instead are being prepared by a salaried staff.

Book publishers have partly taken the place that magazines used to hold. They follow the news; they often rush a book into print before The Saturday Evening Post has got round to discussing the subject. Their news books and topical novels are being sold today in large editions, but the publishers are worried about the next three years. Looking back at the bleak seasons through which they have passed, and looking forward to a paper shortage, they hesitate to offer anything more than the most conservative advances against future royalties. And it is the advances, rather than the royalties themselves, on which most writers have to depend. Emerson Jones says that royalties are something they pay to the heirs of an author who has starved to death.

Hollywood was the writers' paradise of the thirties, and many of them lived on there after dying. In the forties, Hollywood is still paying big salaries, but they seldom go to novelists doing their first job for the films. Continuity writing has become a highly technical profession, with not much room for amateurs. Radio writing, too, is a skilled craft, bearing about the same relation to film writing that the pulp-paper magazines do to the slicks. Jones has very few friends who have been successful there.

He wonders whether he couldn't support himself by lecturing to forums and women's clubs. This was a field that flourished during the depression, when everybody had leisure time to spend. But the lecture agents tell him that the new season is disappointing, and that the only popular speakers are the ones who knew Hitler's chambermaid or escaped from the dungeons of the Ogpu by making love to the commissar's daughter. Very few audiences want to be told about the world of books.

Our friend Jones is an excellent craftsman, but who wants to buy his skill? The government, perhaps? Scores of writers have been hired in Washington by the new committees of information, and he may be able to find an opening there. Failing that, he can raise pigs, or get a clerk's job in some munitions factory, and let his new book wait until after the war.

The achievements of American literature during the last twenty years cannot be explained by any miraculous flowering of talent; in large part they were due to the prosaic fact that more people have been able to support themselves by writing, and for longer periods. These people will have a harder time supporting themselves during the defense emergency, and their achievements are likely to be fewer. Yet in fighting for the defense of a democratic culture, it would be a mistake to lose sight of the culture we are defending. We might come to resemble the hero of an Armenian story that I never saw in any collection of folktales.

It seems that a man named Joe had the finest lamb in all Armenia, with the longest and softest fleece. The lamb was so famous that Joe's wicked neighbors decided to steal it. When he saw them coming, Joe took the lamb in his arms, ran to his cabin and barred the door. He began shooting at the robbers, first from the window on the east, then from the window on the west, then from the east again—but each time he crossed the room, he tripped and fell over the lamb. Finally he opened the door, kicked the lamb outside and went on fighting.

MALCOLM COWLEY

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The Tabloid Kings

My Last Million Readers, by Emile Gauvreau. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 488 pages. $3.

EMILE GAUVREAU hasn't worked for all the golden boys of American journalism, but he did manage to edit papers for Macfadden, Hearst and Moe Annenberg. This personal-experience book describes his circulation battles for them, and takes in also his earlier successes on New Haven and Hartford papers, a turn as investigator for a congressional committee, and interludes in Cuba and Russia. Gauvreau is a man of perception and humor, and he has a knack for telling a good story. His memory is crammed with incidents and famous names. He is a critic who throughout his years of tabloidia looked disapprovingly over his own and his bosses' shoulders. Such ingredients can make an exciting and absorbing book, and this is it. I know of few more readable journalistic autobiographies devoted to the domestic scene.

Strangely enough, the book is more frequently revealing about events and other persons than it is about the author. The outlines of Gauvreau's life are clear enough. Born in New Haven, where his French-Canadian father worked in the gun factory, the young Emile was crippled when a Fourth of July mob set off a powder charge under his window, blowing him out of bed at about the time infantile paralysis was setting in. A poor kid, with the love of music, he quit high school after the second year to take a job on The Journal-Courier. As a $13-a-week reporter he exposed pandering politicians, instigated a police shake-up and solved a murder mystery. As a $15-a-week telegraph editor he underplayed a murder by a Serbian student at Sarajevo, and edited the war news with William Howard Taft and a half dozen other Yale professors hanging over his desk. His reputation as a detective-reporter got him an offer from The Hartford Courant, where a few years later he was a Democratic managing editor of that old and insurance-minded Republican journal. To make the tight wire more perilous, the business manager was ambitious.

This was good training for a Hearst editor, and so were his years on The Graphic. Macfadden had hired him to start that tabloid, and Gauvreau tackled the job with enthusiasm. When everything else was dull, there were always the publisher's health disciples. "They bought Macfadden's daily paper religiously and soon came down in droves to help me run it. The spectacle of powerful gentlemen, sleeves rolled up to bare bulging muscles, while they tore my telephone books in half with one sweep of the hands, was not uncommon when I entered my office. . . . To reach the city room I had to pass a corridor along which were gathered healthy specimens with arms flexed, and, as the editor, I had to feel a number of muscles before I got to my destination."

Hearst appears as a large, loose-boned man nibbling delicately at imported dainties. After talking to Gauvreau for a while, he handed him a hatchet, and together they went out to the lighthouse to uncrate antiques. It was something to do, like chopping wood. Seven years after it was launched, Hearst visited the Mirror office for the first time, remarking that the city room looked too clean for a newspaper office. When the first issue of the paper had been presented to him,

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NR

Hearst had sat barefooted on a pile of cushions, turning the pages with his prehensile toes. All the Hearst footnotes are here—the cynical employees, the firings on Christmas Eve, the memoranda from San Simeon excommunicating from Hearst papers anyone who panned Marion Davies, the efforts to keep Winchell in line. The latter, incidentally, is very unsympathetically portrayed by his former editor on both The Graphic and The Mirror.

The most caustic and at the same time most understanding portrait is that of Arthur Brisbane, who boasted perpetually about the $260,000 a year Hearst paid him, but who seemed to feel that his father would have been ashamed of him. Gauvreau worked under him when Brisbane was called to work his magic with The Mirror's circulation. The editor presents him as The Voice shouting platitudes into his ubiquitous dictaphone. That infernal machine became such an instrument of torture ("Telegrams and memoranda from [it] settled over me like a plague of locusts") that the resentful staff referred to the team as Old Doubledome and his douche bag. But despite the slush from the douche bag, the "Should a Women Tell?" headlines, and the interviews with Jack Dempsey on the fighting prowess of gorillas, Brisbane failed to boom what on any Hearst papers are indeed the vital statistics. In the end, Albert Gobler, the publisher, and the editor were kicked out. Gauvreau's offense was his book "What So Proudly We Hailed," which described Russian accomplishments and American shortcomings.

A fitting climax to this career was Gauvreau's work for Moe Annenberg. After a spell on the Sunday supplement, Gauvreau retired to a Pennsylvania farm with his second wife, his former secretary. Later he returned to edit the rotogravure section of The Philadelphia Inquirer, finally taking on Click as well. Gauvreau doesn't seem very sorry that Moe finally went to jail for income-tax evasion.

All this makes fine reading, although the syntax is occasionally capricious, and the comma has a tendency to run amok, in this manner: "I grew sideburns, which, I hoped would induce the professors to treat me with more respect." But these are minor annoyances in such an entertaining book.

ALBERT HORLINGS

The Snows of Yesterday

The Big Snow, by Jake Falstaff. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 145 pages. $1.75.

A RATHER LOVELY LITTLE BOOK, of places and things that may still be there but cannot be proved simply because we cannot go back again. A successor to "Jacoby's Corners," this book merely shows country life in Ohio as it is enjoyed by a wide-eyed thirteen-year-old, from the first big snow through New Year's and an early thaw. He has uncles and cousins and grandparents and relatives by marriage all over the place, but nothing much happens, and what does happen is wrapped up in the fond and happy stuff of memory. Christmas trees and clan feastings, abundance and tall stories after supper, good rough people and good rough work, a little of schooling and the chill of winter, and the wonderful snow. (The book is illustrated, but as if for four-year-olds.)

What gives the book its special charm is its actual sim-

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plicity within a rich appreciation for the early wonders of the seasons and the ways of people, the care of the house and tools and the stock, the very feel of a time of day. Most "soil" novels attempt this with interminable dullness; most poets get too rarefied and full of omen. Falstaff just talks about the kids and the old folks from the old country, the young couples at a husking and hired men at dinner—and suddenly it is there. But for all his lack of assumption, it is often fine writing. "The next morning it was very cold, a malicious wind rode high and low in the air." Or, "Sometimes it would be dusk. . . . Under the broken ice the water was so cold that the cows drank daintily, lowing a little now and then because the cold hurt the roofs of their mouths. A sort of frightened loneliness would be in the world, and there would be the red of the sun on the snow, which was laced with rabbit tracks." Falstaff for the most part kept himself buried in the Ohio papers, and there were too many people who knew too little about him when he was alive. As a literary world we aren't very bright.

OTIS FERGUSON

Gauntlet with Creases

Challenge to Karl Marx, by John Kenneth Turner. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock. 463 pages. $3.50.

MR. TURNER, we are told, has never been able to swallow Marxism; nor, one is tempted to add, to digest it either. For his volume is neither an intelligent presentation of Marxism nor a stimulating or suggestive critique of its doctrines. Its thesis is the familiar refrain. Marx and Engels were wrong in virtually everything they said; their prophecies were never fulfilled; their social analyses were inaccurate and misleading; their economics was hopelessly muddled; dialectics is a mumbo-jumbo of senselessness; the materialist interpretation of history explains either too much or too little; the strategy that was based on such an inadequate theoretical foundation was even more inadequate; Marx's contribution "was chiefly to load one more variety of supernaturalism upon the groping mentality of the human race"; his followers, in distorting his nonsense, produced even greater nonsense; Lenin was inconsistent, self-contradictory and moved primarily by personal ambition and passion, etc. and etc.

Most of the misinterpretations of Marxism since 1848 have crept into this volume at one point or another. The materialist interpretation of history, for example, is not one of economic motivation. The Marxist conception of the contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production is not one between "the economic system" and "property relations, relations between human beings." Marx did not suggest that under capitalism all classes but the proletariat and the big bourgeoisie would disappear. What he did say was that in modern society only the workers, because of their relationship to the processes of production, were a class of revolutionary significance. The author's use of statistics is, to say the least, unscientific; and the entire volume would have gained much from a serious reading of the reports and monographs of the Temporary National Economic Committee. An increase in the number of stockholders is far less significant than the fact that in 1935,

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persons with an income of $5,000 or less derived only 13.6 percent of their income from property. Figures about higher living standards of the workers in the next fifty years are meaningless unless contrasted with the far greater increase in productive capacity.

But one could fill a volume with a catalogue of such misconceptions. Suffice it to say that those for whom Marxism partakes of the nature of a static and immutable revelation will find Mr. Turner's book disturbing. Those who regard Marxism as a dynamic tool of social analysis, however, can hardly consider this volume a serious challenge to a body of social theory which, where it does not command assent, at least merits understanding.

DAVID W. PETEGORSKY

Winter and Whimsy

The Long Winter Ends, by Newton G. Thomas. New York: The Macmillan Company. 360 pages. $2.75.
Pray for a Tomorrow, by Anne Parrish. New York: Harper and Brothers. 282 pages. $2.50.

MR. THOMAS' NOVEL is a capable, well written and essentially static work. A Cornish miner, his job lost when the pits shut down, migrates to the copper-mining country of upper Michigan toward the end of the last century, grows roots in America and loses his identification with England, fights for an education, survives a vicious winter and at the end brings his wife and young child to the new home and the new citizenship. Dr. Thomas, a former college professor, knows both his Cornwall and his Michigan, handles the fine details of copper mining smoothly and makes the difficult and almost incomprehensible Cornish dialect convincing. The book's faults are chiefly its conflict-free and idyllic structure and the general priggishness of the principal characters. But it is honest, pleasant and probably, in these dubious times, even a patriotic novel. It just happens to be small-scale.

There is not much to be said about Anne Parrish's "Pray for a Tomorrow." The plot concerns a young fisherman named Andrew from an island off the southern coast of England who disowns his friend, a refugee from a German concentration camp, when the villagers take it into their noodles that he is a spy. Andrew is consequently taken by St. Peter on a sort of Christmas Carol tour of man's inhumanity through the ages, stopping off to see monks scourging the insane in France, Jews burned during the Spanish Inquisition, heretics hanged in England, Caligula working over thousands of Christians in Rome and Christ crucified with startling frequency. Then Andrew returns to England, fated to die for St. Peter in the war against Nazism. Most of the folk detail comes right out of "The Golden Bough." The publishers call the book "a new, lovely, sometimes violent, beautifully wrought experience," and Robert Nathan plugged it as "a lovely book." It may be all that for some, but they are probably the ones who think Robert Nathan is a beautifully wrought experience. Those who believe whimsy-writers should leave the subjects of war and Nazism to non-whimsy-writers will just have to leave the room.

STANLEY EDGAR HYMAN

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MAX WERNER's latest book is "Battle for the World: The Strategy of the Second World War."

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JOHN SCOTT was for the past two years the Moscow correspondent of The London News-Chronicle. He was expelled by the Russian government because of censorship difficulties two weeks before war broke out.

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MAURICE HINDUS' most recent book is "Hitler Cannot Conquer Russia," just published by Doubleday, Doran and Company.

MORTON DAUWEN ZABEL edited the anthology: "Literary Opinion in America." He is soon to publish a critical study of nineteenth-century English poetry and a book on Yeats.

ALBERT HORLINGS has published two Middle Western weeklies and worked for newspapers and magazines in Omaha, Pittsburgh and New York.

DAVID W. PETEGORSKY is the author of "Left-Wing Democracy in the English Civil War," an English Left Book Club Choice. A new book, "Strategy for Democracy," of which he is co-author, will soon be published.

STANLEY EDGAR HYMAN, who won The New Republic's college contest last year, is now living in New Hampshire and writing for several New York magazines.

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